



WASHINGTON COLLEGE

International Studies Review



WASHINGTON COLLEGE
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


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For Timothy C. Huston

The *Washington College International Studies Review* is a student journal intended to provide opportunities for undergraduates to publish research articles that contribute to the body of knowledge in international relations and related disciplines, provide fresh insight into the complexities of world affairs, and introduce readers to areas of the world they themselves have not yet explored. The *Washington College International Studies Review* is intended to showcase the research of students of the international disciplines. The journal welcomes writers from all fields of study who have undertaken a project with international concerns at its core, including the areas of politics, economics, literature, art, anthropology, environmental studies, history, and health studies. Washington College students and alumni traveling, working and living abroad are encouraged to submit travelogues for the Notes From Abroad section of the journal.

Electronic submissions and other inquiries should be sent to is_review@washcoll.edu. For submission guidelines, to review past volumes and further information, visit our webpage at <http://students.washcoll.edu/isr/default.html>.

The International Studies program is an interdisciplinary major that includes faculty from Anthropology, Business, Economics, Foreign Languages, History, and Political Science. In addition to the major, students may choose from five regional concentrations: Africa, East Asia, Latin America, Near East, and Western Europe. The academic program provides students with a strong foundation of theoretical knowledge and practical experience. The curriculum is enhanced with opportunities for internships; study abroad and foreign exchanges; extracurricular activities such as the Model United Nations and Model African Union as well as on-campus programming through the Goldstein Program in Public Affairs, International House and International Studies Council. Our majors have careers and advanced training in teaching, politics, business, journalism, international work, and public service.

Founded in 1782 under the patronage of George Washington, Washington College is a private, independent college of the liberal arts and sciences located in historic Chestertown on Maryland's Eastern Shore

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Editors' Note

Many of the concerns that dominate the field of international studies today are based on the importance of allowing people's voices to be heard. Without a diversity of narratives, the highest ideals of democratization, human rights, development, and conflict resolution cannot be realized. It is with this commitment to providing a forum for such voices that we are pleased to bring you the third volume of the *Washington College International Studies Review*. The *Review* was created to provide a formal opportunity for undergraduate students to share their research, experiences, and interests. This year we once again present a wide array of issues, ranging from conflict in Chechnya to pension privatization in Chile. We have also continued our "Notes from Abroad" section, which allows students and alumni to share their personal narratives of international experience. We encourage alumni to continue to contribute their stories, and sincerely thank those who submitted to this year's "Notes from Abroad."

In a continuing effort to widen the range of voices in the *Review*, we have expanded our submission base to include our abroad partners at Rhodes University in South Africa, Lingnan University in Hong Kong, and Royal Holloway College, University of London and University of Hull in the United Kingdom. We are fortunate enough to have submissions from Edoardo Bressanelli of Royal Holloway who contributes a piece on theories of international anarchy, and Ka-Hon Mok of Lingnan University who provides his impressions from studying in Jerusalem in our "Notes from Abroad" section. Additionally, Ellie Hearne, on exchange at Washington College from the University of St. Andrews in Scotland, offers an analysis of the IRA's use of myth, folklore, and symbolism.

We would like to thank Dr. Tahir Shad, Director of the International Studies program and Curator of the Louis L. Goldstein Program in Public Affairs, and Kevin Coveney, Vice President for

Admissions, for their financial support. We would also like to thank Dr. James Sloam at Royal Holloway, University of London, Dr. Paul Harris at Lingnan University, Dr. Thabisi Hoeane at Rhodes University, and Richard Woodward at the University of Hull for their work in promoting the *Review* and for screening submissions at their institutions. We are also grateful to Diane Landskroener for her wonderful production design. Finally, we would like to thank everyone who submitted entries for consideration. Without your willingness and enthusiasm, the *Washington College International Studies Review* would not be possible.

David Hosey '07, Editor
Brenna Schneider '06, Junior Editor
Brian Taylor '08, Junior Editor
Christine J. Wade, Ph.D., Editor-in-Chief




ARTICLES

Resurrecting Martyrs

Religion and Revolution in Nicaragua

DAVID HOSEY



Throughout history, revolutions have relied on the mystique of martyrdom to elevate their cause to a higher level than life itself. The Nicaraguan Revolution, led by the Sandinista National Liberation Front (*Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional*, FSLN) was no exception to this rule. The Sandinistas took their name from historical martyr Augusto César Sandino. Thus, it was not surprising that, when the FSLN took control of the capital city of Managua on July 19, 1979, they emphasized the sacrifices of those who had died to defeat the corrupt and repressive Somoza regime. The revolutionary slogan of "Sandino Yesterday, Sandino Today, Sandino Always" placed the victory in the context of the historical struggles of the Nicaraguan people against oppression.¹ Yet there was another martyr who was honored that day in Managua, a martyr whose death half a world away and almost 2,000 years before had an unpredictably important effect on the Nicaraguan Revolution. This martyr was Jesus of Nazareth, and in addition to the scenes of celebration, the overthrow of the Somoza regime was marked by a mass, led by Archbishop Miguel Obando y Bravo in front of thousands of Nicaraguans and duplicated throughout the country.²

The role of religion makes the Nicaraguan Revolution a unique case in the study of revolutions. The cooperation between Marxism and Christianity—two systems of belief that had previously seemed irreconcilable—is so noteworthy that it led researchers Michael Dodson and Laura Nuzzi O'Shaughnessy to study it separately from other Latin American revolutions. They claim that “the English and American revolutions provide more interesting parallels to the Nicaraguan Revolution than do the...Mexican or Cuban Revolution” due to the religious content of these earlier struggles.³ The chasm between Christianity, a religion often associated with defending the status quo, and Marxism, which calls for radical social change, was bridged by a perspective that became known as liberation theology. In Nicaragua, liberation theology made possible what Thomas Walker calls the “confluence of two grassroots movements...[o]ne...Marxist, the other Catholic,” each of which had been developing for years. Revolutionary tendencies in Nicaragua and liberation theology both have deep historical roots, but both began developing rapidly in the late 1960s and early 1970s, coming to a climax in the revolutionary victory of 1979. During this period, religion, in the vessel of liberation theology, was vital in creating a revolutionary consciousness, organizing resistance, and building links between elites and the masses; subsequently, it had a significant impact on both the success of the Nicaraguan Revolution and its unique, pluralistic outcome.

Historically, Catholicism in Latin America has not often been associated with liberation. When the Church⁴ came to the “New World,” it brought with it a self-righteous worldview and a determination to evangelize the natives by any means necessary, including oppression, violence, and forced conversions. Against the backdrop of this repressive history, however, there were early indications of the possibly uplifting role that religion could have in Latin America. Liberation theologians Leonardo and Clodovis Boff point out that “the historical roots of liberation theology are to be found in the prophetic tradition of evangelists and missionaries from the earliest colonial days in Latin America.”⁵ Foremost among these pioneers of liberation was Bartolomé de las Casas, a Spanish priest who began his ministry in Santa Domingo in 1514 and broke

with the system of oppression by freeing his slaves, advocating non-violence, and arguing for better treatment of the Amerindians by the Spanish government and the Church. His actions earned him the title of “defender of the Indians,” and contemporary theologian Deane William Fernald refers to him as the “Moses of Latin American liberation theology.”⁶

Clergymen like de las Casas, however, were exceptions to the rule. More often, missionaries “used the cross to consecrate the slave labor that had been initiated by the sword.”⁷ It was not until 1962 that the Catholic Church in Latin America began to reconsider its position as the defender of authority. In this year the Second Vatican Council (Vatican II) was convened by Pope John XXIII. After his death, the Council continued to meet under the direction of Pope Paul VI. It was a meeting that would drastically alter the face of theology—and history—in Latin America.

The documents of the Vatican II conference questioned the role of the Church in an ever changing world. Christians were defined as the “Pilgrim People of God” called to act in history, and the Church was instructed to be “concerned about development and...how social science could help explain the changes that wracked such areas as Latin America.”⁸ Building on earlier papal encyclicals, Vatican II argued that it was the Church’s duty to combat the increasing inequality of economic distribution globally. In practice, this meant that priests and nuns were charged to work among the poor, and additionally to attempt to explain the situations and structures leading to intense levels of poverty throughout the Third World. This would often mean criticizing the political and economic situation in which they worked, which represented a true paradigm shift for the Church.⁹ In the years following Vatican II, this new way of looking at the mission of the Church in the world spread rapidly throughout Latin America. This spread culminated in the Second Conference of Latin American Bishops, convened in Medellín, Colombia, in 1968.

At Medellín, the bishops outlined the theoretical basis for a new kind of theology. It was at this conference that the term “liberation theology” came into wide usage. The conference focused on liberation not only from personal sin but also from societal sin and economic dependency. In response to Pope Paul VI’s argument that

Christian teaching was inherently opposed to violence—and thus to Marxism and revolution—the bishops articulated their theory of institutionalized violence, or the “social and structural conditions of poverty that starve the poor.”¹⁰ They affirmed that the Bible demonstrates a “preferential option for the poor,” and that it was the Church’s duty to take the side of the poor and oppressed against the rich and powerful.¹¹ In addition, the Church was to engage in a process of *conscientización*, or consciousness raising, which would create the realization among the poor that they had the right and the power to improve their situation.¹² In practice this meant the creation of small, basic Christian communities (*comunidades eclesiales de base*, CEBs), where priests, nuns, or lay Delegates of the Word would interact with the poor and come to understand the Gospel from the eyes of the oppressed. It was these CEBs that would create the intersection between liberation theology and the Nicaraguan Revolution.

As liberation theology took hold throughout Latin America, Nicaragua was involved in a period of social upheaval. The roots of the conflict lay in years of dictatorship and U.S. intervention. The country’s history had reached a new stage in the 1930s, with the withdrawal of U.S. Marines brought about by Augusto César Sandino’s campaign of guerilla warfare. Unfortunately for Sandino—and, most would say, for Nicaragua—the United States left a young Nicaraguan named Anastasio Somoza García in charge of the newly created National Guard army. Although Sandino, who was mainly interested in self-determination for Nicaragua, was willing to settle for peace, Somoza saw him as a political rival and had him assassinated on February 21, 1934.¹³ By 1937 Somoza had installed himself as dictator, and for the next four decades the Somoza family regime would rule the country, with the backing of the United States and control of the National Guard.

Nicaragua under Somoza rule was marked by repression and dependent economic growth that created a massive gap between the rich and the poor. Anastasio Somoza García was followed by his sons Luis and Anastasio, and while the economy grew with the assistance of massive U.S. aid, social indicators fell: by the 1970s, the poorest 50 percent of Nicaraguans made 15 percent of the total

income, while the richest 5 percent made 30 percent of the income and 0.6 percent of farms held 31 percent of the farmland.¹⁴ By that time, the Marxist-oriented FSLN, which had been formed in 1961 by Carlos Fonseca Amador, Tomás Borge, and Silvio Mayorga, had made a name for itself as the most active anti-Somoza militant group. In 1972, an opportunity for anti-Somoza groups appeared when Nicaragua suffered an earthquake that damaged not only the capital city of Managua but also the Somoza regime's chances of staying in power.

The 1972 earthquake had a number of important effects that boded ill for the Somoza regime. First, the combination of the natural disaster and the corruption of the regime, which proved more than willing to steal aid money for its own profit, led to an economic downturn that angered upper-class Nicaraguans as well as the poor.¹⁵ Second, the atrocious response of the government to the crisis led priests and religious workers who were already critical of the government for its human rights abuses to become even more radical and active.¹⁶ With mass frustration on the rise, the FSLN was able to resume activities that had been put on hiatus by a major defeat in 1967, and in 1974 they completed their most successful guerilla operation, a kidnapping and ransom mission in Managua.¹⁷

In 1975 the FSLN split into three groups. The Prolonged Popular War group wanted to pursue Maoist style rural warfare, while the Proletarian Tendency argued for a mobilization campaign in urban areas. The most successful group, however, was the Terceristas (Third Force), who "rapidly expanded their ranks with members who were non-Marxist socialists, Catholic and Protestant social activists (including priests), and other diverse anti-Somoza advocates of social reform and democracy."¹⁸ It was this group that was able to mobilize support following the assassination of popular newspaper editor Pedro Joaquín Chamorro in January 1978, and it was under the broad coalition forged by this group that the Sandinistas united in 1979 to finally drive Somoza and the National Guard from the country.

Since the most successful Sandinista strategy involved the inclusion of religious believers in its ranks, it is important to examine the

function of religion in the revolution. The first role that the Church had to play in the Nicaraguan Revolution was in the creation of revolutionary consciousness among the masses, a role identified by the Medellín bishops who called for *conscientización* of the poor.¹⁹ Many scholars of revolution have analyzed the importance of revolutionary consciousness, that is, the awareness of the masses of themselves as a potentially revolutionary group. John Foran, in his Boolean analysis of social revolutions, refers to “political cultures of resistance” as the necessary unifying component allowing various groups in a population to coalesce into an effective revolutionary movement.²⁰ Eric Selbin argues for the importance of human agency in revolutions by pointing out the vital role of culture, collective memory, and symbolic politics.²¹ And sociologist James DeFronzo links the mass frustration required for a revolution to begin with a “shift in people’s conception of what is morally right.”²² DeFronzo specifically mentions the poor population of Latin America, highlighting the importance of their realization that their situation was “not God’s will, but rather the will of some individuals and the result of the systems these people defended.”²³ It was this shift in perception that liberation theology aimed to create in Nicaragua.

There were several reasons that religion could play an effective role in the creation of revolutionary consciousness in Nicaragua. The most obvious advantage of religion was the wide access to the population that it provided. Since the vast majority of the Nicaraguan population was Catholic, the creation of CEBs and the training of Delegates of the Word affected the better part of the country. Through these mechanisms the poor were “told that they, too, were made in the image of God” and were “assisted in becoming socially and politically aware.”²⁴ The fact that this message was being spread through the all-pervasive Church made it difficult for the Somoza government to stop. Theologian Robert McAfee Brown, in his commentary on the importance to liberation theology of Mary’s Song in Luke 1:46-55, analyzes the tactical advantage that Christian language gives to revolutionary ideas:

[The worshipers] are singing of a new order, a new world in which all expectations have been turned around....Surely the po-

lice, hearing such revolutionary slogans as "Put down the mighty from their thrones!" and "Exalt those of low degree!" should have their guns at the ready as the crowd leaves the assembly hall. But the crowd understands the wisdom of the serpent as well as the gentleness of the dove. For what can the police, "good Catholics" all, do? All the worshipers are doing is singing a prayer song by a dutiful, demure little Jewish girl who just happens, as far as [they] ... are concerned, to be the Mother of the Lord Jesus Christ and the Queen of Heaven.²⁵

When the Christian message was expressed in its truly revolutionary terms, there was little the authorities could do to combat it: "The military-oligarchy complex could chop down political opponents, but the Church's voice continued to be heard."²⁶ Indeed the Somoza regime, wary of the wrath of the powerful Catholic Church, failed to stop the spread of CEBs until they already had a foundation in the populace.

In addition to this widespread access, the familiarity of the symbols and language of Christianity made the process of consciousness-building more effective. Unlike the complicated themes of Marxist social theory, the peasant masses of Nicaragua were already familiar with the basic message of Christianity. It was thus only up to the liberation theologians to help the poor reinterpret the Bible in a revolutionary context. Members of CEBs, though usually uneducated, were quite capable of reaching their own conclusions about the Christian message once they were given the chance to interact with it on their own terms. Themes of love, justice, and liberation for the poor, when applied to everyday life in Nicaragua, quickly took on a revolutionary character. The God of the Bible was no longer a distant, mysterious, and purely spiritual force, but instead a "living God [that] sides with the oppressed against the pharaohs of this world."²⁷ The success of the CEBs showed that liberation theology did not revolve around a theoretical understanding but instead "emerged from the lives of the poor and oppressed."²⁸

The most well documented example of this is the community established by Ernesto Cardenal on the Solentiname Islands in Lake Nicaragua. Cardenal, a "splendid example of a poet become politician" established the Solentiname community in 1965, where "he

and the community engaged in a continuing series of dialogues that related the gospel lesson of the daily Mass to their everyday lives.”²⁹ Many of these dialogues were recorded and later published. Cardenal was firm in his belief that the poor members of the community were able to provide insights “of greater profundity than that of many theologians” because the “*Gospel*, or ‘Good News’...was written for them, and by people like them.”³⁰ Cardenal’s bold statement that “revolution is love” solidly linked the gospel message with the FSLN cause.³¹ Interestingly, this statement echoes a famous saying of Ché Guevara: “At the risk of seeming ridiculous, let me say to you that the true revolutionary is guided by great feelings of love.”³² It is clear from these connections how religion could play an important role in the creation of a revolutionary consciousness.

One particular aspect of revolutionary consciousness deserves special mention, that of the importance of martyrs. As mentioned earlier, the importance of martyrs to the Sandinistas was crucial. Nolan refers to “the Myth of Sandino,” which informed the thinking of Ernesto Cardenal, Carlos Fonseca, and Humberto Ortega, noting that “a legend emerged in the popular mind of the dialectical struggle between Sandino and Somoza.”³³ Selbin echoes this point: “There seems little question that in Nicaragua the revolutionaries’ use of the figure and persona of Sandino was central to their success.”³⁴ Walker goes a step further, listing Nicaraguan martyrs from the Amerindian chief Dirangén to Carlos Fonseca and noting that “Nicaraguan history and folklore are replete with nationalist heroes and martyrs.”³⁵

If martyrs played a particularly important role in the political culture of resistance encouraged by the FSLN, it provided yet another opening for liberation theology. Christianity revolves around a theme of martyrdom and resurrection, and every mass celebrated recalls the death of its central figure. Liberation theology places particular emphasis on Jesus as the “liberator [who] confronted the oppressors of his day...[and] was martyred as a subversive who had attacked the political and social status quo.”³⁶ Furthermore, just as Jesus conquered death, those who gave their lives for the revolution would not truly die but would instead live on in the struggle of the people. Ernesto Cardenal, discussing this parallel with the

community members of Solentiname, clarifies the point: "the faith in resurrection that Marxist atheists have is very similar to that of Christians....It's not just to be alive in the memory of the people but to be alive *in* the people."³⁷ Through this faith, members of CEBs were called not only to *think* like revolutionary Christians, but to *act* like revolutionary Christians, to sacrifice for the cause of justice and liberation.

When it came time to act, religion proved capable of doing more than just providing ideological justification for revolution. It also served in a second role, as a mechanism for organizing resistance. According to historian Walter LaFeber, the Church "was superbly structured for such activities."³⁸ Again CEBs played a primary role, and again Ernesto Cardenal's Solentiname community provides an excellent example. Although Cardenal, with his Trappist background, was originally a pacifist, he began to gain more and more appreciation for what he saw as the necessity of armed struggle in Nicaragua. Eventually, he gave up his pacifism, and Solentiname became a base for guerilla operations.³⁹ Solentiname was destroyed by the National Guard in 1977 after members of the community participated in an FSLN attack. However, Walker analyzes the trend of violence directed at CEBs by the Somoza regime and concludes that it only caused Catholic youths to grow more radical and join or support the FSLN.⁴⁰

Other CEBs and related communities actively recruited for the FSLN. Walker reports that CEB activities led many community members to start "other grassroots organizations, which mobilized labor, peasants, students, and women."⁴¹ Dodson and Montgomery document the work of the Spanish priest José de la Jara in the Managua *barrios* at the same time as Ernesto Cardenal was founding the Solentiname community, and add that by 1968 Jesuits and students were active in the regions of Carazo, Masaya, and Masapete.⁴² Ernesto Cardenal's brother, the Jesuit priest Fernando Cardenal, created CEBs in the *barrios*, while Miguel D'Escoto, a Maryknoll Missionary, provided international contacts.⁴³ In Managua, Father Uriel Molina founded the Christian Revolutionary Movement (*Movimiento Cristiano Revolucionario*, MCR) in 1972 as a "vehicle for mobilizing radical Catholic activists," and

by 1973 the MCR was a front organization for the FSLN.⁴⁴ These and many other examples show why a Maryknoll Sister named Ita Ford, murdered in December 1980 in El Salvador, could say with confidence before her death that "the Christian Base Communities are the greatest threat to military dictatorship throughout Latin America."⁴⁵

In addition to their roles in CEBs and organizations that recruited for the FSLN, some clergy participated even more directly in the anti-Somoza struggle and in the resulting revolutionary government. Ernesto Cardenal and Miguel D'Escoto took up arms in the revolution and eventually accepted positions as Minister of Culture and Foreign Minister, respectively, while other priests joined the government in social welfare and agricultural reform ministries.⁴⁶ One Spanish priest, Gaspar García Laviana, joined the FSLN as a guerilla soldier.⁴⁷ LaFeber analyzes the change in the clergy from the end of the 1960s to the revolution:

They had begun the seventies ministering to the poor and obeying the instructions of their bishops. They soon learned that neither their commitment to the *campesinos* nor the principles of Medellín could be carried out without political action. When peaceful attempts to obtain food, land, and other rights ended without change or in repression, the clerics moved to nonviolent opposition then to supporting violence. A religious commitment to ameliorate poverty could end in a political, even an armed, commitment to oppose the government. The system that enveloped Central America seemed to leave no other alternative.⁴⁸

Two decades earlier, nobody could have predicated that religious believers would take such an active part in a revolutionary movement in Central America. Yet in Nicaragua they played not only an active part, but a vital one.

The third role of the Church in the Nicaraguan Revolution was one in which even the more conservative bishops and clergy who did not directly support the armed revolt played a part. As the Somoza regime grew more repressive and the human rights situation deteriorated, the church hierarchy as a whole began to criticize the regime, creating elite conflict and providing a link between Nica-

raguan elites and the masses. DeFronzo discusses the importance of “dissident elite political movements,” arguing that they are one of the five critical factors that create the “necessary and sufficient conditions for the success of a revolutionary movement.”⁴⁹ Another theorist of revolution, Richard Lachmann, makes the case that elite conflict provides the most important factor in a successful revolution.⁵⁰ Thus, even the less active clergy who provided what political scientist Philip Williams terms “passive collaboration”—in other words, being critical of both the FSLN and the Somoza regime—ended up aiding the Sandinistas in their primary goal of overthrowing Somoza.⁵¹

The most obvious religious connections between the elites and the masses were the progressive priests and students who interacted directly with the poor through CEBs and similar programs, as discussed at length previously. However, members of the Church hierarchy who would become severe critics of the FSLN and liberation theology after the revolutionary victory were temporary allies of the Sandinistas when it came to overthrowing Somoza. Even Archbishop Obando y Bravo, who would become one of the FSLN’s most outspoken critics, “distanced the church hierarchy from the Somoza regime and backed the protesters” who were campaigning for the release of political prisoners.⁵² Additionally, Obando y Bravo sold a Mercedes-Benz that Somoza had given him as a bribe and gave the money to the poor, symbolically rejecting an alliance with the Somoza regime.⁵³ He joined other Latin American bishops in condemning the 1974 election, thus “signaling that Somoza was becoming vulnerable.”⁵⁴ The next year, several priests testified to the U.S. Congress about the torture policies and human rights abuses of the National Guard.⁵⁵ By the time of the final revolutionary push of 1978-79, the opposition to Somoza included clergy, nuns, businesspeople, and a broad swath of Nicaraguan society, from upper- to lower-class. Religious persons had played an active role in the uprising. From raising consciousness to organizing resistance to creating elite conflict, the Church in Nicaragua had participated in creating a revolutionary situation and overthrowing a brutal dictator, and was now faced with the question of how to form a new society.

It is clear that religious involvement in the Nicaraguan Revolution was vital to its success. LaFeber stresses the importance of priests to the revolution: "At a critical moment they played the major role in transforming a narrow Marxist movement into a more moderate, broad-based, and powerful force."⁵⁶ The fact that the FSLN relied on such a broad coalition for the success of its revolution, however, also had an effect on its specific outcome. The government that developed after the 1979 victory was not a Marxist one-party system, but pluralistic, open, and—as it proved with the defeat of the FSLN in the 1990 election and Daniel Ortega's concession—democratic. According to Nolan, "pluralism has created a political spectrum ranging from neo-Maoists to conservative Catholics and has...allowed a broad Nicaraguan Revolution to flower out of...a narrowly defined Sandinista Revolution."⁵⁷

Religious freedom was guaranteed by the Sandinista government, and in a 1980 statement the National Directorate specifically defended the rights of religious persons in Nicaragua.⁵⁸ Priests were allowed to participate in the government or to criticize the government freely. The National Literacy Crusade of 1980, which reduced illiteracy rates in the country from over 50 percent to less than 13 percent in five months, would not have been possible without the mobilizing activities of the Church.⁵⁹ On the other hand, Obando y Bravo, along with other more conservative clergy, became more and more critical of the FSLN and sought to regain control of the Church from progressive, grassroots influences.⁶⁰ Whether the openness of the post-revolutionary government was positive or negative for Nicaragua is a matter of opinion that will inevitably be based on one's impressions of the viability of the FSLN government. What cannot be disputed, however, is that the involvement of religious believers in the revolution played a huge part in creating the post-revolutionary political situation and in shaping Nicaragua into what it is today.

Almost thirty years after the Sandinista victory, questions remain about the role of religion in the new Nicaragua. Will progressive voices be able to maintain the social programs of the FSLN? Will the conservative factions within the Church continue to regain influence? As the answers to these questions change and develop,

one point remains clear. Liberation theology dramatically changed the way that people in Latin America think of the Church. No longer can religion be solely associated with a conservative force in defense of the status quo. From now on, those in power would be well-advised to keep a wary eye on those reading the Gospels, for what was once a seemingly innocuous book was transformed over a mere ten-year period into a tract for revolution. It remains up to future believers to determine if the dual task of liberating the people from oppression and the Christian message from the hands of the oppressors will be completed.

ENDNOTES

- ¹ National Directorate of the FSLN, "The Role of Religion in the New Nicaragua," in *Sandinistas Speak*, ed. Bruce Marcus (New York: Pathfinder, 1982), 111.
- ² Michael Dodson and T.S. Montgomery, "The Churches in the Nicaraguan Revolution," in *Nicaragua in Revolution* ed. Thomas Walker (New York: Praeger, 1982), 161.
- ³ Michael Dodson and Laura Nuzzi O'Shaughnessy, *Nicaragua's Other Revolution: Religious Faith and Political Struggle* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1990), 7.
- ⁴ This paper refers mainly to the Catholic Church in Nicaragua, as the vast majority of the population is Catholic and liberation theology was primarily a Catholic development. For a discussion of the role of Protestant Churches in the Revolution, see Dodson and Montgomery, "The Churches in the Nicaraguan Revolution." Following Dodson and Montgomery's lead, the term "the Church" in this paper will refer to the Catholic Church. Any references to Protestant or Evangelical churches will be delineated as such.
- ⁵ Leonardo Boff and Clodovis Boff, *Introducing Liberation Theology*, trans. Paul Burns (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1987), 66.
- ⁶ Deane William Ferm, *Third World Liberation Theologies: An Introductory Survey* (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1986), 4.
- ⁷ National Directorate, "The Role of Religion," 109.

- ⁸ Walter LaFeber, *Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America* (New York: Norton, 1984), 219.
- ⁹ Ferm, *Third World Liberation Theologies*, 7.
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
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The Privatization of Chile's Social Security System

A Success?

ANDREW K. MEHDIZADEH



At a 2001 news conference with Chilean President Ricardo Lagos, President Bush noted that the U.S. Congress “could take some lessons from Chile, particularly when it comes to how to run our pension plans.”¹ Referring to the privatization reforms that were made to the Chilean social security system under General Augusto Pinochet, the U.S. President was attempting to make an argument for a similar privatization of the American system. But to what extent have the changes made to the Chilean system been a success? The facts show that the new system has numerous shortfalls, and has failed to deliver on its promises in many ways.

In 1979 and 1980, Chile's autocratic, unelected leader General Pinochet oversaw the privatization of the country's social security (or pension) system. In February 1979, Decree Law 2.448 created minimum standard retirement ages of 65 for men and 60 for women.² In November 1980, Decree Law 3.500 brought an end to the pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) system in which the retirement pensions of the elderly were directly financed by payroll taxes and government subsidies.³ Further reforms were passed in December, and by

the beginning of the following year the system had been completely privatized.

With the exception of the self-employed, the government required all those entering the labor force to participate in the new scheme, but allowed those already in the system to stay if they so chose⁴. According to a Council on Hemispheric Affairs (COHA) report, military personnel were exempt from the transition and were permitted to stay in the old program.⁵ Most, although certainly not all, made the switch, as employers offered an 18 percent wage increase to those who did.⁶ Employers, as well as the regime, often used unsavory methods in order to get citizens to switch. In fact, over 200,000 Chileans were suing the government in 2005 for having used “false advertising” and “malicious propaganda” in its pro-privatization public relations campaign in 1981.⁷ Some actually claimed they were threatened with the loss of their jobs if they refused to make the switch⁸. Proponents of privatization, like former Chilean Labor Secretary José Pinera, boasted that 90 percent of workers chose the new system over the old, but he failed to mention that many had no choice.⁹

In order to acknowledge their previous contributions and entitlements under the old system, those who switched were granted “recognition bonds” by the government.¹⁰ When such workers retire, their bond is cashed in and the money accrued under the old system is given to their Pension Fund Administrator (AFP).

The “central concept” of the new system was an individual contribution rate in which all workers taking part in the program had to direct 10 percent of monthly earnings to a 401(k)-like private retirement account.¹¹ Employers no longer had to pay anything for the pensions of their employees; the individual pensioner would receive his or her pension at retirement solely based on his or her amount of contribution.¹² The retirement accounts of workers were then to be managed, and subsequently invested in financial markets, by heavily regulated private corporations, *Administratadores de Fondos de Pensiones*, or Pension Fund Administrators (AFPs).¹³ The AFPs were to be monitored by the state via the AFP Superintendency.¹⁴ Workers can switch between AFPs at any time to ensure the best management of their money.¹⁵ The AFPs then take the money

and invest it in up to five mutual funds.¹⁶ They usually put a large chunk in government bonds, about a fifth of it in domestic stocks, a third in the financial sector, and roughly 13 percent in foreign stocks.¹⁷ Of the amount contributed each month, roughly 3 percent of a worker's income is taken by the AFP as a disability commission premium fee.¹⁸ These are also known as "administrative fees," so in all AFPs take in about 13.5 percent of a worker's income every month. In addition, AFPs can charge a "flat" fee, a fee incurred regardless of a worker's income.¹⁹

A worker can retire after he or she has contributed to the system for at least 20 years, or if he or she has made 240 monthly contributions in the course of his or her lifetime.²⁰ The idea is for a worker to have contributed enough so that when retirement is reached, he or she has enough money, through growing financial market investments, to be equivalent to 70 percent of his or her former salary.²¹ If at retirement, the amount is enough to be equal to or higher than what the law defines as a minimum pension, the worker can either begin withdrawing funds from his or her AFP or can purchase an annuity from a private insurance company.²² If the amount saved is below the minimum pension level, the government makes up the difference by paying the individual, at the beginning of retirement, the equivalent of about US \$140 a month.²³

If the worker has not made the required number of contributions by the time of retirement, he or she can request an even smaller minimum state pension of US \$70 per month, which even by Chilean standards is a very small sum.²⁴ In the case of disability, a person receives a pension equal to 70 percent of his or her income of the last ten years. In the case of partial disability, he or she receives 50 percent of that same sum from the government²⁵. Hence, the amount a worker made before being disabled, no matter how little the income, determines his or her disability benefits.

Leading proponents of the change, such as former Chilean Labor Minister José Pinera, see no problems with this system. In an essay entitled "Empowering Workers: The Privatization of Social Security in Chile," Pinera highlights what he thinks are the benefits of the Chilean system; citing the high rates of pension fund returns following the privatization and claiming that the investment of pen-

sions in financial markets has greatly increased their size, and thus retirement benefits overall.²⁶ Claiming that the old PAYGO system would have bankrupted Chile, he also declares that the new system has helped cut government expenditures.²⁷ "Workers are free to change from one AFP company to another," he contends, so "there is then competition among the companies" to provide the best service to pension investors.²⁸

Most of Pinera's assertions are either shortsighted or inaccurate. As will be shown, the costs of the reform have been huge, the rates of return have been exaggerated, little competition and efficiency between AFPs has been created by the privatization, administrative fees have taken their tolls on contributions, and women have been hit disproportionately hard by the changes. While leaving the monies of millions of pensioners at the mercy of financial market fluctuations, the system has also disproportionately benefited the wealthy. But the most alarming fact about today's system is that it fails to cover so many people.

Coverage shortfalls and the high rates of noncompliance are two of the Chilean system's major problems. In other words, many are simply not covered by the system, and many others do not contribute. Even the World Bank, which has supported pension privatization in the past, concluded in a 1994 report entitled *Keeping the Promise of Social Security in Latin America* that Chile's system failed to integrate a large number of the pensioners, resulting in poverty among the elderly.²⁹ This lack of contribution is important because it affects not just the particular pensioner, but all those taking part in the system, because the AFPs make money from administrative fees taken as a percentage of a workers income. Therefore, when fewer workers contribute, the AFPs have to charge higher rates to make up for decreased fee revenues.

These problems with lack of integration and noncompliance are partly due to a loophole in Chilean pension law that does not require self-employed or temporary workers, including those working in Chile's large informal sector, to make contributions into their own accounts.³⁰ Together, these individuals make up one-fifth of Chile's labor force, yet fewer than 5 percent of them make contributions.³¹ This is exacerbated by the fact that some of Chile's most

dynamic and labor-intensive industries, including forestry, fruit, fishing, and agriculture, all demand temporary workers.³²

Many others, especially poorer workers, deliberately do not make contributions to evade the 10 percent contribution-rate tax on wages.³³ The unemployment rate was, until very recently, about 10 percent, so many cannot contribute.³⁴ For these reasons, 70 percent of the workforce is thought to contribute less than six months each year into a pension account.³⁵ Furthermore, only 44 percent contribute regularly.³⁶

All in all, the current official estimate is that only 60 percent of the population is covered by the system, but other recent reports have estimated that the number is close to 54 percent.³⁷ Also, according to a Chilean government study, 17 percent of retirement workers over age 65 keep working or head back to work because their pensions do not give them enough income.³⁸ Additionally, the future prospects for those workers planning to retire over the next few decades do not look bright. For example, an article by *The Economist*, typically considered a pro-privatization periodical, acknowledged that "it came as a shock when a recent study suggested that over half of the Chileans affiliated with the system might not get a decent retirement income."³⁹

Another coverage problem is that many of those considered covered will not be able to save enough for retirement to even qualify for a minimum state pension. Thus, there are even more people who are failed by the system. As Manuel Riesco of the Santiago-based National Center for Alternative Development Studies (CEN-DA) said, "the vast majority of the workforce is being left with no pensions at all."⁴⁰ Part of the problem is that the minimum state pension is supposed to be used to help only the extremely poor: even having a color television could disqualify a person from eligibility.⁴¹ Also, since a large percentage of people are unemployed, self-employed, or temporary workers, many do not contribute for the minimum of 20 years required to receive a minimum pension.

The statistics show that many will not even be able to receive a minimum pension, and will instead have to rely on the smaller \$70 a month pension, designed for the very poorest. Even for that there is a waiting list.⁴² The chief regulators of Chile's AFP pension funds,

the Superintendency of Pension Fund administrators, have stated that if low contribution rates continue, nearly half the workforce retiring over the next 30 years will not qualify for even the minimum pension.⁴³ Another study by the same institution, Instituto de Normalizacion Previsional, has an even bleaker outlook: two thirds of worker affiliates will be unable to save enough to receive a minimum pension.⁴⁴ Dean Baker, a Co-director of the Center for Economic and Policy research, therefore said that a system failing half its population cannot be called a success, as "it hasn't provided security to people."⁴⁵ Given the statistics regarding pension coverage, he is absolutely right. Ironically, some of the leading proponents of privatization claimed that the new system would include more of the population in the pension scheme, as only 70 percent were covered by the old pre-1981 system.⁴⁶ Clearly these privatization advocates were incorrect in their predictions.

The key problem seems to be that there is nothing remotely "social" about Chile's social security system. By removing the support of society and placing full responsibility for retirement on individual contributions, the privatized system eliminated the safety net that comprised the "social" aspect of Chile's old, PAYGO social security system. Although some claim the "safety net" was maintained through the minimum state pension, this amount is hardly enough on which to survive.⁴⁷

Another shortfall of the system is that its benefits almost exclusively go to businessmen and the wealthy, while women, the poor, and even many members of Chile's middle class suffer disproportionately. The Chilean system allows the rich to retire with large pensions while the poor, and many in the middle class, are forced to fend for themselves with whatever tiny sum they earned during their lifetimes. For example, Ida Alvarez, a retired Chilean woman who did not contribute for a full 20 years, found that she did not have enough to retire on even at age 70.⁴⁸ Because she only would get what she put into the system, which is very little, she had to continue working just to make ends meet. Her husband's private pension was not enough either, as rent cost nearly as much as his pension. Many argue that even if women cannot always afford a

livable pension on their own, they can rely on their spouse's pension for support. Clearly, that argument is wrong.

The fate of Dagoberto Saez serves as a poignant example of how the system fails even the middle class. Saez made a good income throughout his life, eventually earning a completely adequate salary of \$950 per month.⁴⁹ After working over 24 years as a doctor, he found out that he would only be able to receive pension benefits of \$315 per month after retirement.⁵⁰ Meanwhile, "colleagues and friends with the same pay grade who stayed in the old system are retiring with pensions of almost seven hundred dollars per month—good until they die."⁵¹ He contrasted the bright futures of his friends with his own fate, by concluding that he will be "plunged into poverty" when reaching retirement.⁵² Thus, the privatization of the system negatively affected not only the poorest, but also those in the middle class.

Women have been especially affected by pension privatization in Chile. The new pension system has increased gender inequalities, mostly because, in the new system, the pensions of women are determined exclusively by their past contributions.⁵³ This is problematic because women generally live longer than men, retire earlier, participate less in the labor force, and receive lower salaries⁵⁴. Since the benefits one receives are based on his or her contribution, these truths about women and their working habits mean that their contributions, and therefore their benefits, are invariably lower than those of their male counterparts.⁵⁵ Because their contribution rates are so low, it's no wonder that of those expected to request a minimum pension over the next 20 years, 73 percent are projected to be women.⁵⁶

The statistics show that the retirement futures of many working women in Chile are very bleak. A recent study, for example, has shown that on average the salaries of women are 31 percent lower than those of men.⁵⁷ Correspondingly, the pensions of women are approximately 50 percent to 60 percent lower than those of men.⁵⁸ In addition, according to a 1995 study, a woman whose salary was 75 percent of a given man's salary would receive a pension between 35 percent and 45 percent of his.⁵⁹ Furthermore, if a woman and a

man had the same salary and contributed for the same number of years, the woman's pension would be between 52 percent and 76 percent of the man's.⁶⁰

Today's privatized system also ignores the "difference in cultural and institutional patterns betwixt men and women," as women often quit their jobs after marriage or childbearing, and therefore tend to go back and forth into the labor market.⁶¹ Women's child-care and housework responsibilities strongly curtail their ability to participate in the labor market.⁶² Moreover, traditional social norms "mandate that women remain at home or accept jobs that do not interfere with their domestic and family duties."⁶³ Many women work in the informal sector in Chile, so contributing to their accounts is permitted, but not mandatory. Because women are not paid for household work or childcare, they cannot contribute to their pension funds while carrying out their family duties.

The administrative and "flat" fees incurred on individual pension contributions by the AFPs take a further toll on women and the poor. AFPs have benefited from these large fees⁶⁴ and have become the most profitable Chilean industry.⁶⁵ They receive up to 17 percent to 20 percent of each worker's contributions, and pensions expert Stephen Kay calls the fund management system a "middleman's paradise."⁶⁶ As stated before, the AFPs not only take 10 percent of a worker's monthly income; they also incur an additional 3.5 percent in administrative fees. Also, the "flat fees," which are imposed on contributions regardless of a worker's income, have had a "negative effect on the savings of the lowest income groups."⁶⁷ Even those who favored privatization, such as Presidential candidate Sebastian Pinera, are beginning to criticize the AFP fees.

The argument by privatization advocates that competition between the AFPs would result in better service and lower fees has been proven wrong. As the number of AFPs has decreased from 22 in 1994 to about eight today, there is less and less competition.⁶⁸ According to one report, "in Chile there are only six [AFP] options" with "three of those companies covering the bulk of pensions."⁶⁹ Clearly, the sheer lack of competition is one of the reasons for high administrative fees.

It should be added that AFPs do not compete by offering lower costs. Instead, competition "has been largely based on advertising and large and aggressive sales forces."⁷⁰

For example, companies use "sex appeal" to get customers to switch to their AFPs. Marco Guzman, a factory worker, noted that "lots of pretty saleswomen" from AFPs often come by his place of work to persuade workers to switch to a particular AFP.⁷¹ He noted that many of the women "could not even answer basic questions about the AFP system."⁷² Such promotional advertising is very wasteful and results in higher administrative fees for workers, whom Chilean officials have noted often switch for frivolous reasons.⁷³ The huge administrative and "flat" fees have also reduced the financial returns of Chilean pensioners. The money contributed by Chilean laborers, and subsequently invested in the financial markets, is supposed to grow by significant percentages to ensure secure retirements. But when the fees are factored in, the actual returns and growth of the pensions is much smaller than it seems on paper. Privatization advocates like José Pinera claim that returns have averaged 11 percent since 1981.⁷⁴ For the majority of those with low incomes, real returns after fees are actually negative for the first years of contribution.⁷⁵ When commission and administrative fees are factored in, that 11 percent growth shrinks to just over 5.1 percent.⁷⁶ In fact, the Superintendency of Chilean AFPs has admitted that the returns between 1994 and 2000 were only slightly more than 3.5 percent.⁷⁷

Furthermore, the average worker entering the system since 1990 would have experienced a negative annual return by 2000.⁷⁸ In addition, the risks inherent in the system were shown by the negative 2.5 percent average return in 1995.⁷⁹ The stiff fees raked in by the AFPs also meant that between 1982 and 1986, although the real returns were supposed to be roughly 16 percent, they were actually a mere .33 of a percent.⁸⁰ The future returns are not likely to be much higher: Saloman Brothers, a venerable financial institution, has projected returns of only 5 percent for the "foreseeable future."⁸¹ Another estimate projects that the inflation-adjusted annual returns for the future will be only 2 to 5 percent.⁸²

Pensioners, and their retirement benefits, are at the mercy of the market. As a COHA report recently stated, "The Chilean pension system compromises the safety of worker's investments by risking steep market fluctuations."⁸³ The vulnerability of worker's pensions to market fluctuations was demonstrated in 1998, when declining financial markets led a senior Chilean official to urge workers on the brink of retirement to "wait" before cashing in their funds and retiring.⁸⁴ Also, it is unclear what will happen to stock values, and therefore the value of worker pensions, when the AFPs start selling off large amounts of stock to fund worker retirements in the decades to come.⁸⁵

Although the returns were higher during the first fifteen years following privatization, this soon changed. Back then, the high costs of borrowing for governments and rising interest rates inflated bond returns for investors, thus greatly increasing the value of private pensions.⁸⁶ Also, the privatization of state enterprises at the time boosted investor confidence and encouraged greater financial investments, resulting in the same effects.⁸⁷ Today's returns are much lower, and are not likely to improve.

One of the most common arguments in favor of privatizations is that they reduce government expenditures by reducing the role of the government. Thus, "perhaps the most surprising aspect of the Chilean reform is the high cost of running a privatized system."⁸⁸ Contrary to the common argument, the costs to the state are large, and "the government plays a large financial and administrative role in the privatized pension system."⁸⁹ Since some, including those in the military, chose to stay in the old system, the government has to continue to pay out their more sizable pension benefits without payroll taxes to finance them.⁹⁰ These costs will be phased out by 2025, when all those still participating in the old system will probably have retired.⁹¹ Still, these "transition costs" make up a significant amount of the Chilean federal budget, costing nearly 5 percent of the GDP.⁹² But, as emphasized before, the military and police can stay in the system permanently if they like, so the transition costs they incur could potentially continue indefinitely.

It was noted earlier that the previous Chilean government used "recognition bonds" to entice pensioners participating in the old

system to switch to the new one. Of course, they were offered on high rates of interest, so when those workers retire, paying off the bonds will become a fiscal burden for the government. The total cost of the recognition bonds increased from 1.125 percent in 1981 to nearly 8 percent in 1984, and has only declined slowly since.⁹³ Between 1990 and 1998, the cost of recognition bonds alone had generated a budget deficit equivalent to .167 percent of the GDP.⁹⁴ Although the cost of recognition bonds will steadily decline to zero by 2030, these large costs will peak between now and 2008.⁹⁵

The statistics show that the cost of maintaining Chile's system is enormous, and that it will not decrease anytime soon. Another reason for this is because the minimum pensions are an "ongoing cost to the government" and are "expected to rise after 2029."⁹⁶ The cost to the state under the privatized system is double what it was in 1981, when the older, supposedly more expensive, system was in place.⁹⁷ The deficit generated mushroomed from nearly 4 percent of the GDP in 1981 to 6 percent twenty years later, and remains high to this day.⁹⁸ Public spending, however, is precisely equal to the 1981 numbers, at 6 percent of GDP.⁹⁹ It is estimated that Chile pays 30 percent of its annual budget towards pensions.¹⁰⁰ Other statistics show the same; the cost of maintaining both the public and private systems since 1981 has averaged nearly 6 percent of GDP per year and represents 42 percent of the government's social spending, and 27 percent of total spending.¹⁰¹

How have these costs been paid? The transition costs were primarily financed through privatizations of state industries and by issuing long-term public debts.¹⁰² According to a COHA report, large costs played into the hands of neoliberal politicians, especially in Pinochet's old regime, who were eager to find reasons to cut social spending and state intervention in the economy.¹⁰³ Indeed, under Pinochet's government, expenditures in health and education were dramatically slashed.¹⁰⁴ Perhaps in the future, rising pension costs will leave politicians no choice but to do the same by cutting spending in essential areas.

The high costs of the Chilean system, the exorbitantly high fees it imposes on the contributions of citizens, the problems it has caused for the women and impoverished, and its failure to cover

large amounts of the population renders the privatization of Chilean pensions a colossal mistake. It is no surprise, therefore, that because of its ineffectiveness, 90 percent of Chileans would, if possible, choose to go back to the old system.¹⁰⁵ Newly-inaugurated Michelle Bachelet, Chile's first female president, has declared Chile's pension system "in crisis."¹⁰⁶ She promises to send a reform bill to Congress next year. There is a broad consensus in Chile that changes need to be made. Hopefully, she will be able to take advantage of this momentum to take bold steps for reform.

ENDNOTES

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
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The Effects of Labor Migration on Egyptian Women and Society

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Labor migration is a relatively recent phenomenon given Egypt's long history. Resulting from the policies of Gamal Abd al-Nasser and Anwar Sadat, the practice became increasingly common in the 1970's and continues today. Of the many effects of labor migration and the resulting remittances, its effects on women are of particular interest. Society is beginning to change to accommodate the lack of a male presence; however, traditional beliefs continue to affect how women can handle the new possibilities and necessities created by migration. Ironically, it is the opinion of fellow women that seems to have the greatest influence on women's roles within the changing confines of society. This paper will explore the problems that have arisen since Egyptian males have fled to find work in other Gulf States, and the solutions that the women left behind have created to meet these problems.

In order to fully appreciate the effects of labor migration, its causes must first be understood. When Nasser came to power in 1952, he faced considerable inequality within Egyptian society. At the time of Nasser's ascension to power, 0.4 percent of all land-owners were in control of 35 percent of the nation's land.¹ One of

Nasser's first actions was to limit the amount of land that any one person was able to hold. In 1953 the limit was 200 faddans, and the land allowance continued to decrease, eventually reaching an allowance of 50 faddans in 1969.² The extra land was confiscated by the government and redistributed to the landless or those with less than five faddans.³

To try and solve Egypt's economic crisis, Nasser began to implement a socialist economy.⁴ The government began redistributing land, favoring smaller farms over large estates, and developing industry.⁵ Unfortunately, there were two major problems with Egypt's ability to industrialize. First, the people lacked the skills necessary for an industrialized country; second, the country lacked the capital necessary to fully industrialize.⁶ In the end, Nasser was disillusioned with his own goals and the Egyptian government ended up seizing control of most industries, resulting in their nationalization. In the end, only "retail trade and housing were left to the private sector."⁷ Moreover, by 1964, all foreign-owned businesses were nationalized by the Egyptian government.⁸ In yet another attempt at reform, Nasser further declared that the country would implement mass education programs and large scale subsidies for rent and basic needs.⁹

In 1970, Nasser was succeeded by Anwar Sadat. Of the many goals that Sadat set for himself, the most important were arguably his economic policies. He created what was by 1974 referred to as *infitah*, or "open door."¹⁰ The policy, as its translation implies, was to open—or liberalize—the Egyptian economy to foreign investment. This was a reversal of the policies of Nasser, who nationalized almost every industry. Sadat also made strides to ally Egypt with the United States, which meant breaking strong ties with the Soviet Union.¹¹ This was, debatably, yet another attempt by Sadat to lure foreign investment. Some specific changes that Sadat made included tax exemptions for foreign banks, lenient import regulations so businesses could bring their own capital to Egypt, and new land regulations which made it easier to buy and sell land.¹² Unfortunately, Sadat's reforms did little to improve the economy. Foreign investment was primarily limited to low risk ventures, such as office buildings, housing or hotels.¹³ Despite Sadat's efforts, Egypt was

plagued by high inflation, a high defense budget and high debt.¹⁴ In the end, the government, highly dependent on foreign loans, could not support the economy. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) informed Sadat that as long as subsidies continued, Egypt would not qualify for further loans. In response to this warning by the IMF, Sadat cut subsidies on some goods while eliminating them on others. Some of the most common goods for which Sadat cut subsidies included bread, sugar and rice.¹⁵

The policies of both Nasser and Sadat led to the widespread practice of labor migration. Following the *infitah*, it became increasingly difficult for families to make ends meet, which further encouraged the migration of Egyptian male laborers.¹⁶ By 1979, the remittances that resulted from labor migration totaled \$2 billion annually, a figure that equaled the combined revenues of "Egypt's cotton exports, Suez Canal receipts, tourism and the value added from the Aswan High Dam."¹⁷ Egyptians fled all over the Arab world in search of work. The benefits and opportunities were not limited to any one group or type of laborer, as workers in all sectors and from all skill levels were able to find work in the surrounding states.¹⁸ By the late 1970's, the magnitude of Egyptian labor migration was astounding. Ralph Sell predicts in his article, "Egyptian International Labor Migration and Social Processes: Toward Regional Integration," that as many as 7 million Egyptians may have been working abroad in 1985, which would mean that approximately 10 percent of the total population was working outside the country.¹⁹ Sell also reports that in 1986 the number of Egyptians working abroad decreased to 3.5 million. While the total number of Egyptian laborers finding work outside of the country decreased in 1986, the figure still indicates that 10 percent of Egypt's labor force was finding work outside of the country.²⁰ A further example of the enormity of the situation is illustrated by the fact that in 1975, over 6 percent of the total population of Kuwait was Egyptian.²¹ Today, there are an estimated 2.9 million expatriates living and working outside of Egypt.²²

The effects of labor migration have been felt in many aspects of Egyptian life. Domestic wages have increased since the Egyptian labor migration boom as a result of the decrease in laborers within

Egypt. A large number of migrants are construction workers, and this has resulted in an increased domestic demand for construction workers.²³ As a result of the increasing number of remittances being sent home, a growing number of construction projects are being started domestically.²⁴ This situation can be explained by employing basic economic principles. If the supply of labor is limited and there is an increase in demand for labor, which is the result of an increased demand for new building projects, then there is disequilibrium within the labor market. In order to rectify the situation, the wage for labor would have to increase to attract the workers needed to complete the projects, which has in fact occurred in Egyptian construction firms. Paradoxically, Egypt has to import its own labor force to meet the needs of the market. Legal migrants are coming from Korea, China, France and the United States.²⁵

Besides the effects on wages and labor shortages within Egypt, the effects of labor migration are felt by the women left behind. This is especially true for the women of the middle and working classes.²⁶ With the men gone, the women are left to take care of the daily activities. This often means addressing everyday issues and concerns, as well as taking on new responsibilities from which women have traditionally been excluded. One way women are compensating for the absence of their husbands and male relatives is to take on the household shopping. Traditionally, women did not go to the market, as this was considered a man's domain.²⁷ Due to necessity, however, women have assumed this basic task.

Since women are traditionally not supposed to leave their neighborhoods, especially without male accompaniment, the emerging necessity for women to venture outside of the neighborhood to complete daily tasks has been rather overwhelming for many women, who had until this time remained fairly isolated. With husbands gone, wives have found themselves having to go to the bank and post office. These tasks, unlike many of the others that women have taken on, require them to have at least a basic knowledge of how to read and write, and therefore, were initially the most difficult to assume. Once Egyptian women increase their understanding of the process of managing the household and their knowledge of how to

complete outside tasks, these chores will presumably become just another part of their daily routines.

Ironically, some women have argued that their daily household workload has actually decreased since their husbands have been abroad.²⁸ This statement seems counterintuitive, as it is reasonable to assume that upon a husband's departure, women would have twice as much to do. While this is true to an extent, in that they are doing tasks, such as shopping and fully managing the finances, which have traditionally been reserved for men, they also have free time that would normally be spent catering to their husbands. For instance, with their husbands gone wives do not have to cook such elaborate meals, which means that they now have extra time in their day.²⁹

The practice of women working has also become increasingly more common due to labor migration.³⁰ However, women working outside the home has not come without debate. The definition of "work" has been contested, but it is now generally thought, within Egypt, that a woman is considered to be "working" when her activity "interrupts the natural rhythm of the day or takes the woman for long periods of time on a regular basis away from the domestic context in which her responsibilities are centered."³¹ The opinion of the community is very important not just to the woman, but to her entire family, which is why the definition of work is so important. It is considered acceptable for a woman to help earn income for her family, as long as the income-generating activity is not considered "work."³² Examples of acceptable income-earning activities are washing fruits and vegetables for a peddler, cooking food (either for neighbors or to be sold in shops or by street vendors), making handicrafts and raising farm animals such as sheep or chickens.³³ Another acceptable income generating activity would be sewing dresses in the home. Working, however, would mean being employed in a shop several days a week or cleaning houses for a few hours a week.³⁴ Based on the above definition of work, it can be argued that all of the activities that are not considered to be work "don't take the woman away from the home on a regular basis or interrupt the routine of the household."³⁵ Indeed, all of the activi-

ties that are considered acceptable forms of income generation can be done from the home in the woman's spare time. Nevertheless, when women are forced to find work outside of the home, they prefer to work in the public sector: unlike the private sector, the public sector provides subsidized transportation costs, child care and maternity leave.³⁶

This idea of work versus income generation is important because, in Egyptian society, women are often defined by their neighbors' approval or disapproval. Traditionally, women gain the approval of their community by staying at home and running a sound household. A woman's generosity is also a key factor.³⁷ There are ways for women to curb the disapproval of their neighbors, should they find it financially necessary to have to work. For instance, a woman could be escorted to and from work by a male relative, she could dress more modestly for work or she could lie about where she works or that she works at all.³⁸ Public opinion is so important, in part, because a woman's opportunity for social mobility lies in her ability to marry upwards.³⁹ If her approval within a community is low, it will make it more difficult for her to marry someone better off financially and socially, which in turn increases the necessity for her to work.

Besides social mobility and marriage potential, a woman's image within her community is important because of the networks that she must develop. With the prevalence of labor migration, these networks have become increasingly important to the women left behind.⁴⁰ The networks are important for a variety of reasons. First, they provide the women left behind with companionship. Women are free to meet in each others' homes to talk, drink tea or watch television (providing that there is a television in the neighborhood); in this manner, network relationships provide a social support system.⁴¹ Second, networks give women a means of aid by allowing them to pool their resources, including food and time.⁴² To elaborate, should a woman have to work to supplement her husband's income, strong local networks can provide her with childcare while she is at work. Women can also pool their resources during holidays and celebrate together by cooking one feast which all participating families will enjoy, to which each woman will con-

tribute a portion of the meal. A final example of networking is that, since items such as televisions and refrigerators are relatively rare in many of the poorer neighborhoods of Egypt, networks can provide access to these items by allowing women without these items to share with their neighbors who may be fortunate enough to have them.⁴³ These networks work on a reciprocal basis, and provide much-needed support for women who are trying to manage households by themselves. The more inclusive a woman's networks are, the more respected she is within her community. However, in order to be able to develop networks, she must first be in her neighbors' good graces, meaning that she cannot go against traditional values and embarrass her neighbors or her family by her actions.

Social class restrictions and values have denied the women of the lower class the same opportunities for advancement that women of the higher social classes have enjoyed. The lower class of Cairo is referred to as the *Baladi* class. In translation, *baladi* means "traditional," and Baladi women believe that there are four traditional virtues which are telling of a woman's character.⁴⁴ The four virtues are piety, authenticity, savvy and destitution.⁴⁵ Despite the hardships felt by members of this class, they have to balance the economic advancement of their family with these values and the expectations that their class and society hold for them. Therefore, lower class women usually only decide to work when it is absolutely necessary for their family, as they do not want to appear to be bad wives and mothers.⁴⁶ Since their primary responsibility is to the household chores and activities, they must focus on completing these tasks.⁴⁷

However, as the Sadat era came to a close, it was becoming more and more common to find women of the lower classes working. There are three major explanations for this change. First, rising inflation made it increasingly difficult for women not to work and still support their family. Second, communities were faced with rising expectations about what constituted a basic need. Finally, the women of the lower class saw women of the middle class working without it affecting their social status.⁴⁸ The reason behind a great majority of the inequalities between classes is the set of values and traditions that the classes hold to be important. For women of the

lower class, traditional values and views have made it rather difficult to advance in the same ways that women of higher means have.

In contrast, with the emergence of *infatih* women of the upper-middle class have been able to take advantage of the opportunities being afforded them because their class as a whole lacks strong ties to traditional ways of life.⁴⁹ Additionally, women of higher social status can afford to hire maids and servants to lessen their daily responsibilities, which provides them with more opportunities to find work outside of the home without jeopardizing their womanly duties.⁵⁰ Furthermore, because the responsibilities and obligations of upper class women are different from lower class women, it is more common to see girls of this social status participating in higher education.⁵¹ This allows them to get better jobs outside of the home.

There are some Baladi women who do find work selling goods at the local markets, and while traditionally this would be socially unacceptable for many reasons, Egyptian society is slowly starting to adapt to their presence. Baladi women who work in the market adapt a persona that allows them respect and personal space within the market setting. They often dress in black and use speech that would normally be considered inappropriate for women to use, let alone use in public.⁵² A Baladi woman working in this atmosphere is referred to as a "mualimma" and she is both respected and feared. Furthermore, she is "untouched by innuendos of loose morals reserved for other 'street women.'"⁵³ This is just another example of society adapting to the changing needs of the time.

Another aspect of a woman's life that is affected by the migration of her husband is her place of residence. Her age and the number of years she has been married generally determine where she will live while her husband is away. The younger the wife, the more likely it is that she will return to her home while her husband is away. Another possibility is that she will go and live with her husband's family, although this is usually only the case when living with her family is not an option, or when she is married to a man of a higher social status.⁵⁴ Living with extended family is also fairly common if the couple does not have children. However, if the couple has been married a long time, the wife is advanced in age, or if there are

children involved, the woman will often be able to remain in her house during her husband's absence.⁵⁵ One problem that frequently emerges when wives move back in with their families, or in with their in-laws, is that they lose control of the remittances that they would otherwise have if they were in their own house.⁵⁶

Labor migration has had a significant impact not only on the women left behind, but also on society as a whole. Women have found more opportunities available to them, due in large part to their greater responsibilities. Furthermore, the context in which women function within society has been altered. For better or for worse, it can not be ignored that shifts are taking place within the traditional framework of the country. These changes can be credited largely to the need to make a living, which became increasingly more difficult for the men to do while working domestically under the rule of both Nasser and Sadat. There is a great amount of economic and social uncertainty associated with labor migration. What will happen to the Egyptian economy and social structure should the Gulf states no longer have a need for foreign labor and the Egyptian economy is inundated with returning labor migrants? It is a reasonable prediction that the sudden dramatic increase in labor will cause drastic decreases in wages domestically. As for the social effects that might be created by such a change, these are hard to predict. For now, labor migration has forced the women of Egypt out of their homes and into society, and, despite some resistance, women have been able to forge a path for themselves within the existing social structure.

ENDNOTES

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- ³ Cleveland, p. 299
- ⁴ Lapidus, p. 524
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⁷ Lapidus, p. 526

⁸ Cleveland, p. 308

⁹ Lapidus, p. 526

¹⁰ Lapidus, p. 527

¹¹ Cleveland, p. 364

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¹³ Cleveland, p. 367

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¹⁶ Tucker, Judith E. ed. *Arab Women: Old Boundaries, New Frontiers*. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 1993.

¹⁷ LaTowsky, Robert J. "Egyptian Labor Abroad: Mass Participation and Modest Returns." *MERIP Reports*, No. 123. May, 1984, p.11-18. <http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0047-7265%28198405%290%3A123%3C11%3AELAMPA%E2.0.CO%3B2-Z>

¹⁸ LaTowsky

¹⁹ Sell, p. 91

The author explains that he arrived at his predictions by assuming that ratios of labor migrants to population have remained constant over time. He gives a brief overview of the history of labor migration in his article in which he describes where he came to his conclusions. He also discusses the likelihood of many migrants going illegally which would skew official tallies.

²⁰ Sell, p, 91

²¹ LaTowsky

The author also mentions that over 10 percent of Kuwait's total population is from South Asia. This provides an interesting perspective into the Kuwaiti society. It would be interesting to investigate the reasons behind the need for such a high amount of foreign labor. This investigation could be conducted on all states in the region that are recipients of foreign labor. Unfortunately, these questions are not answered by Robert J. LaTowsky in his article.

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- 28 Singerman and Hoodfar, p. 57
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- 30 In the explanation that follows, the women being referred to are of lower class status.
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- 41 Singerman and Hoodfar, p. 61
- 42 Singerman and Hoodfar, p. 61

⁴³ Some of the ideas of this section were derived from discussions in “Women and Economic Development in North Africa and the Middle East” as taught by John Shoup at Al Akhawayn University in Ifrane, Morocco during the spring semester of 2004. Television is rather important to the culture during holidays such as Ramadan. During this time, there are special programs broadcasted which become a part of the Ramadan celebration.

⁴⁴ Tucker, p. 85

⁴⁵ Tucker, p. 85

⁴⁶ Fernea, p. 280

⁴⁷ Fernea, p. 287

⁴⁸ Fernea, p. 284

A thorough explanation as to why women of the middle class were seemingly exempt from the harsh social criticism of having to work has not been found. The books read for this paper describe the differences between the middle and lower classes, but do not offer an in depth answer as to why this is the case.

⁴⁹ Fernea, p. 57 and 279

⁵⁰ Fernea, p. 287

⁵¹ Hatem, p. 240

⁵² Tucker, p. 88

⁵³ Tucker, p. 88

⁵⁴ Singerman and Hoodfar, p. 56

⁵⁵ Singerman and Hoodfar, p. 55

⁵⁶ Hatem, p. 238

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
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“Anarchy is what states make of it?”

The Nature of Foreign Policy in International Relations

EDOARDO BRESSANELLI



A systemic theory explains international politics; a reductionist (domestic) theory explains foreign policy.¹ Given this statement, a sharp distinction, at least in systemic analysis, is made between international and foreign policies. This is consistent with Alexander Wendt's comment "I am interested in international politics, not foreign policy."² Wendt, though challenging the rationalistic and materialistic assumptions of Neorealists, agrees with them about underlining the importance of systemic interactions, keeping basically a state-centric view. Therefore, it could sound rather odd to ask for an interpretation of the famous sentence "anarchy is what states make of it" under the light of foreign policy analysis.³ Certainly, Wendt's purpose lies in sketching a constructivist theory of international politics, both in his articles and, more at length, in his book *Social Theory of International Politics* (1999).⁴ In the latter he examines the "ontology of the states system," a concern which does not fit very well with practical (empirical) politics.⁵ However, constructivism—and even reflectivist *theory*—can provide a powerful account about concrete foreign policies of states. The main goal of this paper is to demonstrate *how* and *to what extent* it is able to do that.

As Wendt declares, "Neorealism admittedly is not designed to explain foreign policy."⁶ What is the bridge that constructivism supplies between the international and the domestic systems? The answer needs to be found in the fourth condition for structure, which Wendt adds to Kenneth Waltz's theory: in short, "the intersubjectively constituted structure of identities and interests in the system."⁷ This is a massive shift, with great implications for foreign policy making. After having discussed these implications, I will turn to some criticisms that could be moved against constructivist theory, keeping in mind that it is not directly meant to explain foreign policy.

Waltz vs. Wendt: a shift in ontology with empirical turnouts

Since Wendt uses Waltz's theory as a starting point, it is worth having a closer look at *Theory of International Politics*, especially as long as foreign policy is concerned. An outline of the fundamental features of Neorealism starts with a delineation of the basic properties of international structure. The structure is made up of three main elements: an ordering principle, the character of the units, and the distribution of capabilities. Since in the international system the second element is ignored, because of the formal equality of the units, anarchy and the distribution of capabilities remain the essential structural properties.⁸ In the endless debate between "structure" and "process," Neorealists focus strongly on the former. They claim that only structural properties, often ignored by scholars of international relations, can provide a full picture of the international system. "Structure" thus explains states' behaviour: under anarchy, states live in a "self-help" world. Being concerned with their own survival, they concentrate on military expenditures. Cooperation is very limited, if not absent, because states don't care about absolute gains, but are more interested in relative ones. This shows that the international system, resembling the economic market, is deeply rooted in competition. "Anarchy" generates "power

politics" and "self-help." This is a very simplified view of Waltz's thought, but enables the reader to grasp a very clear-cut conception of neorealism.

For the sake of his argument Wendt sketches a similar picture of neorealism. It is worth noticing, nevertheless, that Wendt's appreciation is more directed towards *Man, the State and War*, written by Waltz in 1954.⁹ Waltz shows a preference for analysing international relations via the international system, but "anarchy" has not become the overriding explanatory factor yet. "First image" and "second image" theories are useful in filling the gap left by "anarchy" as a mere permissive cause. This is, arguably, the starting point for social constructivism. In order to briefly sum up Wendt's thoughts, it could be said that anarchy—the essential principle of international order—is like an empty box. The states can put in it whatever they like. Thus, "anarchy" does not necessarily imply "self-help." However, if the box is used to collect "oranges," it is improbable that anyone will put "shoes" into it.

This concept works in a similar fashion in international relations. A State, behaving in an aggressive manner, will force other states to follow its path. However, this is not necessarily so. States can respect each other and set formal and informal rules of cooperation, developing a shared understanding. "Anarchy," hence, "is what states make of it" because its content depends on "process," on what states do and how they perceive each other. It follows that states' identities are important. Their formation, their recognition, their stabilisation (what Wendt calls "institutionalization") are central for understanding the factual behaviour of the states. This is the deficiency in neorealism. Capabilities and material resources certainly have a significant importance, not in and of themselves, but rather through the way they are perceived by other actors. Once these perceptions are stabilised, there is a relatively stable stage, where every state performs a precise role. Naturally, identities are neither fixed nor immobile, but transforming them is a time-consuming process. What, then, is the real content of "anarchy?"

TABLE 1. Cultures of Anarchy*

Security systems	Identification with the Other	Leading school in IR theory	Reference in the history of political thought	Tools in foreign policy
Competitive	Negative	Neo-Realism	Hobbes	War, instrumental alliances
Individualistic	Indifferent	Weak Liberalism	Locke	Trade agreements, limited cooperation
Cooperative	Positive	Strong Liberalism / Constructivism	Kant	Collective security agreements

*The expression is Wendt's (1999:246). *Source:* personal elaboration from Wendt 1992:399–401; 1994:385–387; 1999.


Table 1 gives an overall picture of what Wendt incisively defines as “cultures of anarchy.”¹⁰ Anarchy, therefore, *permits* all the above arrangements. What is the justification for each one of them? What makes one “culture” dominant, rather than another? The answer may be found in the social context and in the narrative and relational skills of the states. In the case of two states A and B, unknown to each other, the way in which A’s action is perceived by B is crucial. If B thinks that A’s action is threatening, B will react accordingly. The negative response will compel A to “mirror” B’s act, and so on. It is a spiral of reciprocal distrust, which falls perfectly into a neorealist conception of anarchy. It goes without saying that such a description implies equality among the states, and brackets domestic, ideological, and self-perception factors.¹¹

There is another way, nevertheless, to represent “how states make anarchy,” rather than enclosing each “culture” in a table cell. By means of a spectrum, having on its extreme left side the individual, and on its extreme right side an integrated community, we are given a more process-oriented and truly interactionist view of these diverse arrangements. Though Wendt does not provide a determinist or teleological justification for his argument, it is empirically apparent that norms and “institutions,” defined broadly as “a relatively stable set or structure of identities and interests” have become

more sophisticated over time.¹² Borrowing Barry Buzan's expression, anarchies grew more "mature."¹³ Another advantage given by using this "identification continuum" lies in its juxtaposition with the "power spectrum" employed in foreign policy analysis.¹⁴

FIGURE 1. "Identification continuum" and "Power spectrum"

The constructivist claim that states make whatever they wish



Source: personal elaboration from Wendt, 1994 385 – 387 "Power spectrum" from Hill, 2003:135

from anarchy allows—in theory—for the use of every possible foreign policy tool. In practice, there is always the need to look at empirical patterns of interaction. In an ultra-competitive environment, where life is "nasty, brutish and short," negative identification forces states to search for relative gains.¹⁵ In such a world it is worth recalling the Latin dictum: *mors tua, vita mea*. War is always likely, and so frequent that Clausewitz must be turned up side down: "politics is the continuation of war with other means." On the other side of the continuum, in contrast, there is an almost complete identification with the neighbour. Diplomacy, with its routine practices, and cultural exchanges prepare the ground for the formation of "security communities," as they were classically defined by Karl Deutsch: "integrated groups, accompanied by formal and informal institutions and practices."¹⁶ Still, there is a certain degree of variability, as we move from "pluralistic security communities" to "amalgamated security communities," and only in the latter does the expectation for peace becomes a certainty. The individualist ontology of neorealists is reshaped by constructivism: "solidarism" bounds the states, which share increasingly sovereign powers. Con-

structivism thus explains another very significant trend in contemporary foreign policies: "regionalization." The construction of the European Union (EU) cannot be understood only as a reflection of super-power competition, as a product of the Cold War, but implies an overcoming of ancient critical junctures (such as the struggle between France and Germany) and the critical redefinition of self-identity (something that could partially be seen in the UK).

This last reflection leads to what is perhaps the most innovative contribution of reflectivist theory in studying foreign policy. The emphasis on the intersubjective formation of identity compels politicians to take into account the identity variable in foreign policy making. The emergence of a predator states can be fought, for instance, by employing a "policy of recognition."¹⁷ The Germans could have perhaps been pacified in the inter-war period, by recognizing what kind of trauma the Versailles Treaty (1919) with its harshly punitive content and the need to resettle had created for the Germans.

The concept of recognition is not, however, just a matter of external recognition, but also involves a strong account about the perception of a state's own identity. Wendt explains the latter by distinguishing, at Mead's manner, among two parts in individual identity. The "me" is given by social interaction: it is roughly the role I have been assigned in the social context. If we were just "me," identity would be determined by the family, the community, the state and so on. There is, however, a creative part, which Mead calls "I." That expresses the "existential freedom" of the person, and permits a conscious reformulation of identity. The "I" could thus lead to a radical change in the way an individual (or a state) is socially perceived and interpreted. Being a difficult and time consuming task, it is pursued only "exceptionally."¹⁸

The best example Wendt could provide of this would be President Gorbachev's "New Thinking." But the same could be said about Chancellor Willie Brandt's *Ostpolitik* towards his Eastern German neighbours. Chancellor Brandt understood that the road to German reunification passed through the perception of Germany in countries such as Poland or Czech Republic. In order to modify

the deeply rooted view that a reunified Germany would have looked for its *Lebensraum* in the East, Brandt visited these countries, commemorating the Holocaust and reassuring--with formal acts--their elites about German intentions. He was playing "altercasting," "stagecraft"¹⁹ or adopting "rhetorical practises."²⁰ The exceptionality of this conduct of foreign policy is clearly apparent: it implies a conscious redefinition of personal identity, including a narrative approach towards significant past traumas.²¹

The sentence "anarchy is what states make of it" thus has important consequences for the formulation of foreign policy. It goes beyond realist structuralism, looking at empirical patterns of interactions among states. It accounts for a huge variety of behaviours, defined as "dependent variables," the "independent variables" being identities. Nonetheless, identity is not given exogenously, but constructed endogenously via intersubjective learning. The foreign policy of a set of states needs to be foreseen by observing the degree of socialization among them. When it is low, conflict and competition must be expected; otherwise, cooperative attitudes and "security communities" are more likely. Finally, underlining the role of identity, constructivism emphasises the importance of transformative practices. Perception--being so fundamental in foreign policy--can be consciously modified: a state chooses to perform a new role in the system, and practical tools, such as self-binding commitments and unilateral disarmament, are powerful means to achieve this objective.

Some remarks to Wendt's constructivist theory

As stressed in the introduction, neither Waltz nor Wendt's theories of international politics are meant to explain foreign policy. However, the latter explicitly mentions the likely empirical spill-over: "managing this problem [treating identities] is the basic practical problem of foreign policy."²² This implies that neither power nor material capabilities primarily define the external actions of a state. It is a radical shift from realist perspectives, but not an unbiased one.

Wendt describes a binary relationship among states. The model is

constructed in such a way: A acts and B reacts; A mirrors B's action, and so on. This process is quite straightforward both from A and B's perspective and, over time, becomes "institutionalized." Nevertheless, the picture gets more complicated when B is put alongside C, D...n, where n is the maximum number of "significant Others."²³ How can A form its identity, when it is no longer a matter of mirroring single actions? How can it choose among equally relevant stimuli? The clashes between "significant Others" can make identity formation much more difficult than expected. In order to clarify the concept, let us consider Italy's foreign policy behaviour. Italy was among the founders of the European Community in the early 1950s, and after WWII has maintained a friendly relationship with the USA, despite occasional disputes. Italy has, in our over-simplified model—two "significant Others": the EC and the USA. As long as these two actors agreed, Italy had an easy task. The Iraqi war, however, has produced a quarrel: which partnership does Italy prefer? Though deeply embedded in European affairs, Italy has chosen to participate in the conflict, taking a part in the democratic transition of Iraq. The struggle between conflicting "significant Others" has produced a shift in foreign policy formulation: traditionally supporting "Europe," Italy has come to aid its American ally.

Furthermore, there is another problem regarding personal identity. Wendt treats states as units, keeping a state-centric approach typical of neorealists too. States do have multiple social identities—as Wendt puts it, the US could be both the "fighters of Communism" and the "defenders of human rights."²⁴ Nevertheless, this state-centric approach greatly simplifies the process of identity formation. Its outcome seems to be certain: "multiple social identities" are merely a product of social interaction, and states—in constructivism rational actors too—can instrumentally use them as foreign policy tools. This criticism disputes Wendt's "modern" view under two perspectives: a) a *sociological* critique, and b) a *bureaucratic approach* critique. The first critique centres on post-modern accounts of identity. Are we still entitled, in our times, to describe people (and conversely, states) *as if* they possess a clear-cut identity, centred on a straightforward attribution of a status and a role? Or, rather, would it be better to speak about a "patchwork identity," a

tormented and fluid construction of the self?²⁵ Though it is not possible to address these engaging questions in this work, it is worth considering that the answer given brings significant implications for foreign policy making. Perhaps Wendt could discuss post-modern critiques at length instead of limiting himself to sporadic references. The second critique concentrates on the same problem but focused on foreign policy makers. Wendt's state-centrism takes into special account leaders and key ministers: they define state identity, and what counts in foreign policy is their perception of other identities. Though these agents clearly have a central role, Wendt's analysis could appear somewhat old-fashioned, as neither bureaucracies²⁶ nor transnational actors²⁷ necessarily play a great role in identity formation.

Last but not least, intersubjective learning is certainly possible when communication channels are opened and cultural exchanges and routine foreign policy practices favour interaction among states. What is it going to happen when a crisis breaks out? Are the neorealists right, at last, since in a crisis states' identities are reduced to their core, that is to say to self-preservation instincts? The positive and "creative" description of foreign policy given by constructivists, and Wendt in particular, could thus be biased for implying a normative concern about the reality they are meant to describe.

Conclusions

"Anarchy is what states make of it" means, in foreign policy, that states have at their disposal a wide range of tools, from military attack to cultural exchanges. However, constructivism does not see social reality under Hobbesian lens. Its account is far more positive: states do learn by interacting, and institutions create stable expectations and patterns. The contemporary world is better described with a Kantian model: cooperation and multi-lateral agreements are creating a sort of international society.

As we have seen, a number of criticisms can be moved against constructivism. Its scientific observations sometimes slip towards prescriptive judgements. The construction of identities is a trouble-

some process, and constructivism builds its argument precisely on this initial consideration. However, the outcome appears too clear-cut. Individuals and states form their identity through process: they could see themselves as unitary actors. Post-modern thinking has questioned the integrity of identity, wondering whether it still makes sense to speak about identity at all. The truth lies, perhaps, in the middle. Certainly, especially in a contending arena such as contemporary foreign policy making, the label "identity" must be used with great attention.²⁸ Too strong a focus on a few actors and an undisputed conception of identity represents a misleading guideline for foreign policy making.

ENDNOTES

- ¹ Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (London, McGraw-Hill, 1979), 121 – 122.
- ² Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge, CUP, 1999), 11.
- ³ Alexander Wendt, *Anarchy is what states make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics*, *International Organization*, 1992, Vol. 46, n. 3, 391 – 425.
- ⁴ See Wendt, 1992 and Alexander Wendt, *Collective Identity Formation and the International State*, *American Political Science Review*, 1994, Vol. 88, 384 – 396.
- ⁵ Wendt, 1999, 6.
- ⁶ Wendt, 1999, 18.
- ⁷ Wendt, 1992, 401.
- ⁸ Waltz, 1979, 79 – 111.
- ⁹ See Wendt, 1992, 395 – 396.
- ¹⁰ Wendt, 1999, 246.
- ¹¹ For a detailed account, in a psycho-political fashion, of "conflict-strategies" confront Noel Kaplowitz, *Psychopolitical Dimensions of International Relations: The Reciprocal Effects of Conflict Strategies*, *International Studies Quarterly*, 1984, Vol. 28, n. 4, 373 – 406.
- ¹² Wendt, 1992, 399.

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- ¹³ Barry Buzan, *The Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism to Structural Realism* (New York, Columbia UP, 1993).
- ¹⁴ Christopher Hill, *The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy* (New York, Palgrave Mac Millan, 2003), 135.
- ¹⁵ Thomas Hobbes, *The Leviathan* (Bristol, Thoemmes, 2003 [1651]).
- ¹⁶ Karl W. Deutsch, *Security Communities*, in: James N. Rosenau, *International Politics and Foreign Policy: a Reader in Research and Theory* (New York, Free Press, 1961).
- ¹⁷ Charles Taylor, *Multiculturalism: Examining the Policy of Recognition* (Princeton, Princeton UP, 1994).
- ¹⁸ Wendt, 1992, 419.
- ¹⁹ Wendt, 1992, 420 – 423.
- ²⁰ Wendt, 1994, 390 – 391.
- ²¹ Confront Nicholas Pethes, Jens Ruchatz, *Dizionario della Memoria e del Ricordo* (Milano, Mondadori, 2002).
- ²² Wendt, 1999, 21.
- ²³ See George H. Mead, *Mind, Self and Society* (Chicago, Chicago UP, 1967).
- ²⁴ Wendt, 1992, 420 – 422.
- ²⁵ Post-modern challenge to “identity” has produced a lively debate in the literature. See, *inter alia*, Gianni Vattimo, *The Transparent Society* (Oxford, Polity, 1992) and Zygmunt Bauman, *Postmodernity and its Discontents* (Oxford, Polity, 1997).
- ²⁶ See the pivotal study of Graham T. Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (New York, Harper Collins, 1971).
- ²⁷ James N. Rosenau, *Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier: Explaining Governance in a Turbulent World* (Cambridge, CUP, 1997).
- ²⁸ Mark Webber, Michael Smith, *Foreign Policy in a Transformed World* (Harlow, Prentice Hall, 2002).

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Politics, Puppets, and Shadows:

The Transition from Sukarno to Suharto

CHRISTINA NAGUIAT



Indonesia is a country of fascinating artistic culture, beliefs, and political history. In reference to Indonesia's artistic contributions, one thinks of its *wayang kulit*, or shadow puppets. Shadow puppetry opens the famous Indonesian movie, "The Year of Living Dangerously," directed by Peter Weir, which is about the chaotic 1960s when Indonesia's founding father, Sukarno, was ousted from power. The transition from Sukarno to a supposedly anti-Communist militant, Suharto, was an enormous event in Indonesian political history.¹ Behind the scenes, the United States and its Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is rumored to have been heavily involved in supporting this change in the political scenery in order to install a native "puppet" government, lead by Suharto. Indonesia was important to the United States and its CIA because of Cold War politics. In Indonesian politics, as in shadow puppetry, not everything is what it seems. A historical analysis of the transition period explains the turmoil at the beginning of Sukarno's regime, the United States' interest in Indonesia, the political and military discontent resulting from poor judgments, the transition of power from Sukarno to Suharto, and the similarities and differences between the regimes of Sukarno and Suharto.

Brief History

Sukarno became a key player in Indonesian history when he declared the country's independence after the Japanese surrender at the end of World War II. During World War II, Indonesia was under Japanese occupation.² Prior to Japanese occupation, Indonesia had been a Dutch colony, and the Dutch refused to grant Indonesia its independence after the war.³ Finally on December 27, 1949, after years of rebellious movements and United Nations disapproval, the Dutch gave Indonesia its long awaited independence.⁴ The independence movements were based on Indonesian nationalism, and included all classes and ethnicities, "uniting them in a common commitment to the cause of independence and a powerful sense of liberation and idealism."⁵

Throughout Indonesian history, the country has attracted international attention, first from the Dutch, then from the Japanese, and finally from the United States. The United States was most involved in Indonesian history after World War II. However, the United States was forced to work in the shadows after the Dutch gave Indonesia its independence, as it did not want to be perceived as expansionist or imperialistic.

New Republic

The new Indonesian republic initially set out to follow the United States' model of democracy, and instituted a new Constitution in 1949.⁶ Sukarno wanted to improve the well-being of the new republic through economic development. Because of his efforts, "Sukarno, Indonesia's first President and father of the nation, was often referred to as the *dalang* of the Indonesian people."⁷ A *dalang* is the puppet master in Indonesian shadow puppetry. The puppet master is a highly skilled artist who has an almost magical control over all elements of the puppet show. Sukarno tried to combine Western elements with native ideas, synthesizing liberalism and Marxism as well as ideas from Hinduism, Buddhism, and mysticism.⁸ Past rulers in Indonesia would sponsor the showing of shadow puppetry, in order to bring wealth and good

fortune to the town.⁹ Sukarno's "magical talents" would prove insufficient to control all the economic levers in a new environment and would eventually result in a predominately socialist economic order. Sukarno had the charisma to manipulate and control many things; however, he would not be fortunate enough to have similar success in bringing wealth and good fortune to the newly independent nation of Indonesia.

The Emergence of Dissension

For approximately eight years after independence from the Dutch, no parliamentary elections were held; instead, the legislative branch was made up of appointees from the major political parties.¹⁰ This method was unproductive and not effective for policy making. Societal groups that had competed under Dutch rule and Japanese occupation, which had vanished during Indonesia's nationalist movement, now reappeared. Now a sovereign state, Indonesia was free to create its own government, but divisions quickly emerged. Indonesian political parties, deeply divided along ideological, religious, ethnic and regional lines, disagreed as to how Indonesia's parliamentary system should work. Even Sukarno, a charismatic leader, was not strong enough to gain the cooperation of these political parties. In effect, "the issues dividing the parties- the question of an Islamic state, whether a secular state should pursue Nationalist or Communist goals- were too contentious to make viable coalitions possible and the country slid toward disintegration."¹¹

Eventually, Sukarno gave up his attempts to create a parliamentary government, and announced "the creation of a dictatorship with himself ruling over an appointed assembly," resulting in the creation of "Guided Democracy."¹² With "Guided Democracy," Sukarno initiated martial law, suspended parliament, got rid of opposing political parties, and increased the Indonesian Communist Party's role in the government to try and balance the growing power of the military. "Guided Democracy" was a front, designed to convince the Indonesian population that there was some type of democracy in place; however, Sukarno employed authoritarian measures. Initially the military backed Sukarno, but its support be-

gan to waiver as Sukarno centralized power, taking it away from regional areas, where the army had held significant influence.¹³

Not only was the military beginning to become discontented with Sukarno, but factionalized Muslim groups began to form an opposing coalition. It is also believed that in the shadows, the CIA began to support rebel movements within Indonesia.¹⁴ The United States had reason to believe that Indonesia's political stability was questionable as, in the 12 years since the 1949 declaration of independence, the country had had 17 governments.¹⁵ The United States saw this an opportune time to influence Indonesia. After having so many different governments in such a short time, the country would need some guidance in order to maintain stability. Indonesia was geographically important to the United States because of its location between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean. Indonesia's geographic position put it within range of Vietnam as well as of the Philippines. If Indonesia decided to change its nonalignment status, its vicinity to the Philippines could threaten the security of U.S. military personnel stationed at naval bases in the Philippines and American regional interests.¹⁶ Military security was heightened during this time because of the Cold War. Indonesia would play a large role in security considerations, secondary only to Vietnam.¹⁷ Indonesia was also abundant in its natural resources; therefore, American oil companies were heavily invested in the country's future.¹⁸ Large companies, especially multinational corporations, thus had a strong influence in American domestic politics, as well as on the United States' foreign policy.

Economy

However, despite its natural resources, Indonesia's economy was struggling. The country had hoped to strengthen its economy after gaining independence, but no policies were created to improve the situation. Perhaps the lack of cooperation between political parties of different ideologies, religions, and regional concerns stalled the policy-making process. However, the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) gained a widespread following during this difficult period because of Sukarno's implementation of land reform in the early 1960s,

which took land away from landowners and gave it to poor Javanese, Balinese, and northern Sumatrans.¹⁹ Violence erupted, marking the beginning of a chaotic, troubled, and aggressive period in Indonesia's history: "The PKI membership rolls totaled two million, making it the world's largest communist party in a noncommunist country... [while] affiliated union and peasant organizations had together as many as nine million members."²⁰ These growing numbers began to frighten the Americans, who had trusted Sukarno's nonalignment stance during the Cold War. However, it began to seem that he was increasingly leaning toward Communism. Although Sukarno was trying to counterbalance the military through mass mobilization, his actions were perceived as biased by the United States.²¹

Sometimes actions speak louder than words, but interpretation can play a large role in politics. Sukarno's decisions would have an impact not only domestically but on an international scale as well. Taking the role of an all powerful puppet master, "Sukarno ignored the recommendations of technocrats and foreign aid donors, eyed overseas expansion, and built expensive public monuments and government buildings at home."²² His lack of concern for improvement in infrastructure, welfare, and social programs caused food shortages and hyperinflation to have even more impact on the population.²³ The United States Congress was hesitant to intervene in the economic situation in Indonesia but nonetheless it offered assistance; this time, however, aid came with conditions.²⁴ The United States wanted Sukarno to end Indonesia's confrontation in Malaysia in return for the aid.²⁵ Sukarno was infuriated that there were conditions to this supposed generosity and refused the much-needed assistance.²⁶ American policy-makers in Washington took his refusal of their assistance personally. They began to believe that Sukarno was "arrogant, insulting, incompetent, and unstable."²⁷

Political and Military Discontent

In late January 1965, discontent in the Indonesian military was on the rise and plans for a change in government were in motion.²⁸ The main reason behind the deterioration in the relationship between the military and the government was the confrontation in re-

gards to the new country of Malaysia.²⁹ Sukarno had launched the campaign "to protest the establishment of the Malaysian...Sabah and Sarawak states on Borneo Island."³⁰ In order to gain public support for this military campaign, Sukarno needed the masses on his side. He therefore rewarded bureaucrats, who were able to mobilize the masses on his behalf, to leadership positions in the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI).³¹ This added to the impression that Sukarno was no longer anti-Communist, but rather a PKI sympathizer.

Involved in the Cold War with the Soviet Union, the United States was extremely sensitive to the spreading of communist sentiment in Asia and the rest of the world. The United States felt that Sukarno was beginning to sympathize with the PKI, which put him in a negative situation. The United States was particularly afraid that there might be a domino effect in Asia if one country fell to communism. However, officials at the American Embassy in Jakarta thought that Sukarno had everything under control and could handle the PKI.³²

On September 30, 1965 a group of junior military officers attempted a coup, killing 6 generals.³³ The rest of the military, under the leadership and direction of Suharto, fought back against the insurgent group of junior military officials.³⁴ Lurking in the shadows, as always, the CIA was curious to know who Suharto was, what his background was, and what he represented. The CIA believed that Suharto was anti-communist, but knew little else about him.³⁵ Suharto laid the blame for the coup plot on the PKI.³⁶ This accusation would begin two years known as the 'Years of Living Dangerously' as "members of the now outlawed PKI were executed to purge the nation of leftist sentiments."³⁷ The purge resulted in the deaths of approximately 300,000-400,000 Communist party members and people of Chinese descent.³⁸ It has been argued that the U.S. Embassy of Jakarta might have given lists of leading communists to the military.³⁹ The CIA and American Embassy in Jakarta were not just bystanders; but were involved:

When the putschists turned to Washington for weapons "to arm Moslems and nationalist youth in Central Java for use against the

PKI,” they admitted this was part of an army policy “to eliminate the PKI.” Washington responded swiftly and sympathetically.⁴⁰

Later on, a CIA report described the extent of the slaughter, comparing it to other infamous massacres in the 20th century:

In terms of the numbers killed, the anti-PKI massacres in Indonesia rank as one of the worst mass murders of the 20th century, along with the Soviet purges of the 1930s, the Nazi mass murders during the Second World War, and the Maoist bloodbath of the early 1950s.⁴¹

Transition of Power From Sukarno to Suharto

On March 11, 1966 Sukarno was forced to give Suharto a presidential mandate, giving him full executive powers to preserve and protect the nation’s security until the transition from the “Old Order” to the “New Order” was completed.⁴² Immediately after the official transfer of power, Suharto, being the United States’ puppet, quickly changed Indonesia’s foreign policy. Indonesia had been in conflict with Malaysia and friendly with China, but under Suharto it aligned with Japan and the West.⁴³ One sign which indicated Indonesia’s new willingness to ally with the West was its leading role in the 1967 formation of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), comprised of all the Asian nations that militarily aligned themselves with the United States.⁴⁴

Additionally, Suharto gathered together a strong group of technocrats focused on improving Indonesia’s poor economy.⁴⁵ These actions were aimed obsessively at growth because high ranking military officials were extremely corrupt, eager to line their own pockets with state funds.⁴⁶ Human rights continued to deteriorate, as the military did not take responsibility for protecting rights and often committed human rights violations themselves.⁴⁷ The American and the Japanese were happy with the new regime because of tax incentives which encouraged foreign direct investment: “By 1977, the Americans and the Japanese had invested [US] \$8 billion in Indonesia.”⁴⁸

Another Authoritarian Regime

The new regime was not unlike Sukarno's old regime. In fact, the *de facto* political party, GOLKAR, forced opposition parties into two different coalitions that were internally divided, preventing them from posing a serious threat to GOLKAR. Parliament ended up being a rubber-stamp: "The running joke about the parliament is that its activities can be summarized by the five D's: *dating, duduk, dengar, diam, duit*, which roughly translated, means 'show up, sit down, listen, shut up, and collect your paycheck.'"⁴⁹

While Suharto fed disappointed American hopes for a puppet government in Indonesia, one of the positive aspects of Sukarno's presidency was that he had partially fulfilled that wish by paying heed to economic development advice from the United States and the technocrats. This resulted in a brief economic boom during the 1970s which Suharto happily accepted as a gift upon his accession to power. By the early 1980s a recession in the oil market had badly hurt the Indonesian government's revenue.⁵⁰ Rather than seeking more advice from the United States, Suharto, now President of Indonesia, decided to close down large heavy industrial projects that were oil-financed, such as a petrochemical complex, an electrical generating program, and an alumina plant, resulting in a further economic slump.⁵¹ This behavior was no longer one of a CIA puppet, but rather of a person who had established himself as a puppet master within the first few years of his presidency. By the mid-1990s there had been several riots in which the military had been sent in to quiet protesters.⁵² This military response displayed Suharto's keenness to control Indonesia, similar to a puppet master controlling his characters in a *wayang kulit* performance. Among the Indonesian population, "whispers of shadowy bomb plots and echoes of loud, defensive rhetoric filled the...air."⁵³ The scene had been set for another shadow puppet skit. These riots are expressions of a cycle which repeats itself throughout Indonesian history, in which initial good intentions are followed by mismanagement, corruption, suppression, and violence.

Conclusion

Several political scientists have argued that the *wayang kulit*, Indonesian shadow puppetry, is an important metaphor in understanding Indonesian politics.⁵⁴ While there is no direct evidence of the CIA's participation in replacing Sukarno with Suharto, the United States' involvement in the shadows was a key component of the political transition. The CIA and the United States might not have been successful in creating a solid "puppet" government, but they did welcome the political transition because the Suharto regime embraced the West with a greater intensity than did the Sukarno regime. In the *wayang kulit*, performances tend to last hours without coming to a climax, and their endings have little variation. Although it can be argued that the regimes of Sukarno and Suharto both ended in loss of power, both regimes lasted several decades, and in the end both regimes resorted to similar authoritarian measures. The *wayang kulit* performances can therefore be compared to Indonesia's political history. Unveiling what lies in the shadows has always been a difficult task. Perhaps it is the existence of shadows, however, which drives people to discover what happens behind the scenes. It is fascinating to think that an Indonesian art, *wayang kulit*, is a useful tool in explaining this transitional political period in Indonesia's history.

ENDNOTES

- ¹ It is common in Indonesia, particularly among the Javanese, to simply have a single name such as Sukarno, Suharto or Sudomo. Presidents Sukarno and Suharto of Indonesia were Javanese and their full names were "Sukarno" and "Suharto." However, the prefix of "Su" at the beginning of those names is not a part of the person's original name, but an honorific meaning "good" or "nice." Thus the first president of Indone-

- sia's real name is Karno, not Sukarno, and President Suharto's real name is Harto. Information taken from: <<http://www.cnn.com/interactive/specials/9906/indonesia.names/content.html>> (Accessed February 2006).
- 2 Mike Mason, "Southeast Asia: Indonesia: Independence and the New Order." *Development and Disorder: A History of the Third World since 1945*. (London: University Press of New England, 1997), 327.
- 3 Mark Borthwick, *Pacific Century: The Emergence of Modern Pacific Asia*, 2nd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998), 231.
- 4 Borthwick, 233.
- 5 Borthwick, 232.
- 6 William Case, "Indonesia," *The Southeast Asia Handbook* (London: Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers, 2001), eds. Patrick Heenan and Monique Lamontagne. 103.
- 7 David Atkinson, "Wayang kulit-," 26 October 1998, <<http://minyos.its.rmit.edu.au/~dwa/WayangKulit.html>> (April 2005).
- 8 Mason, 328.
- 9 Murni's, "Wayang kulit: shadow puppet performances," <<http://www.murnis.com/culture/articlewayangkulit.htm>> (April 2005).
- 10 Mason, 329.
- 11 Vera Simone, *The Asian Pacific: Political and Economic Development in a Global Context*, 2nd ed. (New York: Longman Press, 2001), 142.
- 12 Mason, 329.
- 13 Mason, 329.
- 14 Simone, 142.
- 15 Benjamin Higgins, *Indonesia's Economic Stabilization and Development*. (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1957), 107.
- 16 H.W. Brands, "The Limits of Manipulation: How the United States Didn't Topple Sukarno," *The Journal of American History* 76, no. 3 (Dec., 1989): 789.
- 17 Brands, 799.
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- 19 "Indonesia: Years of Living Dangerously," November 1992, <<http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-6200.html>> (April 2005).
- 20 "Indonesia: Years of Living Dangerously."
- 21 Brands, 792.
- 22 "Indonesia: Years of Living Dangerously."
- 23 "Indonesia: Years of Living Dangerously."
- 24 Brands, 794.
- 25 Brands, 794.
- 26 Brands, 794.
- 27 Brands, 794.
- 28 Brands, 798.
- 29 Thomas E. Sidwell, *The Indonesian Military: Dwi Fungsi and Territorial Operations*. (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies Office, 1995), 3. <http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/fmsopubs/issues/indo/indo.htm>
- 30 "Indonesia: Sukarno's presidency 1945-1966," CNN. *com/World*. 21 February 2001. <http://edition.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/southeast/02/19/indonesia.timeline/#sukarno> (April 2005).
- 31 Case, 103.
- 32 Brands, 798.
- 33 Brands, 801.
- 34 Brands, 801.
- 35 Brands, 801.
- 36 "Indonesia: Sukarno's presidency 1945-1966."
- 37 Sidwell, 4.
- 38 "Indonesia: Sukarno's presidency 1945-1966."
- 39 Mason, 332.
- 40 Mason, 332.
- 41 Mason, 332.
- 42 Borthwick, 341.
- 43 Borthwick, 341.
- 44 Mason, 332.
- 45 Borthwick, 341.
- 46 Mason, 335.

- ⁴⁷ Mason, 333.
⁴⁸ Mason, 333.
⁴⁹ Adam Schwarz, *A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia's Search for Stability*, 2nd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2000), 272.
⁵⁰ Mason, 335.
⁵¹ Mason, 335.
⁵² Nisid Hajari. "Indonesia: Playing With Fire." *Time.com* 151, no.7 (23 February, 1998).
⁵³ Hajari.
⁵⁴ "Wayang kulit: shadow puppet performances."

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
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The Irish Republican Army: From Myth to Mobilization

Irish Folklore and Myth as an Ideology
of National Liberation

ELLIE B. HEARNE



Formed in the early twentieth century, the Irish Republican Army has had a deep impact not only on the governance of Northern Ireland, but also on the way people view political violence worldwide. Many view the IRA's heyday to have lasted from the late 1960s through the 1970s, since the organization and its various splinter groups (such as the Provisional IRA, the Continuity IRA, and the Real IRA) have been active in the United Kingdom since then. Although the IRA's long-term struggle is domestic (concerning land within the British Isles), the group draws its support from a worldwide base. In fact, the IRA has been known to have helped train other terrorists and revolutionaries. Although its strategies have been exported to other countries, the nationalist objectives of the organization lend themselves to the use of Irish folklore and myth as a means to bolster support. Through a combination of clever leadership, manipulation of a culture that is recognized the world over, and the use of controlled violence, the Irish Republican Army has achieved a degree of success in developing an ideology of national liberation for Ireland. This paper shall assess the extent to which the organization has succeeded in this, with reference to its use of Celtic myth and contemporary Irish culture.

Furthermore, it shall look at the background of the IRA's formation and examine how leadership has been employed to induce a feeling of pride and to spur revolutionary action.

In studying any nationalist movement, it is useful to examine its historical background. Indeed, it is from Ireland's rich history that the IRA has borrowed various symbols, myths, and folklore to suit its own purpose. The organization was born of a long history of conflict within Ireland. The famous Easter Rebellion in Dublin in 1916 marked only one of many violent struggles for power on the island. Following a Viking invasion in CE 800, Ireland was invaded yet again, though this time by the Normans.¹ The Normans began to colonize sections of Ireland and, in 1172, the Norman King of England assumed control of the island.² However, it was only in the 1500s that religious tension became an official part of Ireland's stormy history. After an attempt by Henry VIII to export an Irish version of his Church of England to the island, Irish Catholics began to rebel against the King's rule. The troubles of this conflict have left a hazy legacy that has "literally continued into the twenty-first century in Ireland."³

Certainly, the IRA's ideological roots lie both in the country's stormy relationship with Great Britain and in the tensions between Protestantism and Catholicism. The issue of home rule dominated the Irish political scene from as early as 1874, but it was not until 1916 that the nationalist cause reached a violent crux in the Easter Rebellion.⁴ Home rule would have spelled partial independence for the island, "an autonomous Irish parliament, subordinate to Britain, [maintained] at Westminster by an Irish Parliamentary Party," led by Charles Parnell. However, the rise of Sinn Féin (a political separatist movement) spelled destruction for both the Parliamentary Party and for the whole policy of home rule.⁵ Significantly, support for home rule was based in part on the cultural and religious differences between the two islands.⁶ This reinforces the idea that the use of cultural myth and folklore is suited to the Irish cause.

In addition, at this time a patriotic band of America's Irish immigrants were beginning to sympathize with a group "far more

clandestine" than the IRA, known as the Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB).⁷ The IRB was engaged in a campaign of assassination and bombing aimed at perceived enemies of Ireland's liberation. Its targets included Unionists, British forces supporting the Unionist cause, and the Royal Irish Constabulary. Largely as a result of this hostility, the Unionists began to gravitate toward their trade unions and Orange Lodges (named for seventeenth century English king William the III or 'William of Orange'), thus further fueling the conflict. The Unionists' use of the color orange, symbolizing a figure from English history, demonstrates how even the IRA's opponents have employed symbolism to great effect in this fight.

A major turning point in Irish history came in 1919 when Sinn Féin (led by Eamon de Valera), and the IRA (under the leadership of Michael Collins), began a fight for Irish autonomy from Britain. In 1921, the Anglo-Irish Treaty granted independence to all but six of Ireland's thirty-two counties. Indeed, the region of Ulster in the north (the area where, during the Plantation of Ulster in the 1600s, English and Scottish Protestants settled under the rule of Elizabeth I) remains under British control today. Edward Price categorizes the Northern Irish situation as one of "internal colonialism," but the specifics of the conflict are less straightforward.⁸ The formation of the IRA resulted from the parallel movements of nationalist uprising in Ireland itself and, significantly, support from overseas factions of groups sympathetic to the Irish cause. Though the Irish Republican Brotherhood (a precursor to the IRA) was formed in Dublin in 1858, a division of this violent group was born of lasting Irish pride and folklore in America.⁹

Following the U.S. Civil War, America was home to a growing number of Irish immigrants who still identified strongly with their mother country. The role of Civil War veterans provides ghostly foreshadowing of the involvement of Great War veterans who were active in Ireland at the birth of the IRA.¹⁰ Lacking any allegiance to the relatively new American nation, these Irish-Americans were ideally suited to fight for the cause of national liberation for Ireland. At the same time, a "revival of Irishness" helped reassert national identity and, in turn, the Irish political will was regenerated:

There was a deep and pervasive cultural regeneration in Ireland fostered by organizations such as the Gaelic Athletic Association, the Gaelic League, [and] various sections of the priesthood... There was also a spontaneous renaissance of all manner of Gaelic literature.¹¹

All of this set the scene for a nationalist group to appeal to the population and provided an alternative to the allegiances fostered in British-run institutions.

A series of failed nationalist uprisings in 1798, 1803, 1848, and 1916 meant that, by the time the Anglo-Irish Treaty was signed in 1921, dissatisfaction with the British had already firmly rooted itself in Irish political will.¹² Following the Anglo-Irish Treaty's passage, the Irish Civil War began.¹³ Soon, the IRA was outlawed, slowing its operations and forcing it to lay dormant for around half a century. It was the issue of Catholic rights in the largely Protestant north that re-ignited the violence:

The non-violent Catholic demonstrations for civil rights in the 1960s generated a violent Protestant backlash, and the massive communal rioting of August 1969 convinced the working-class Catholics of the need to defend their neighborhoods against the Protestant mobs by force.¹⁴

In order to quell the violence that had broken out, Britain "reacted with a heavy hand against the civil rights workers," and unwittingly rejuvenated the Provisional Irish Republican Army.¹⁵ Until this point, "the Provisional IRA was popular in song and legend, but it held little sway in day-to-day politics."¹⁶ Both sides in this conflict have extensively employed symbolism and, even today, areas of Belfast are adorned with large murals on the sides of buildings depicting British flags, Irish flags, the Red Hand of Ulster, and various political messages. Upon their arrival in Northern Ireland in the late 1960s, the British Army was confronted with such images and, naturally enough, was inclined to side with those who revered the flag of their own nation. As White explains, "Ironically, the British Army became the miracle that the IRA so desperately needed."¹⁷

This episode demonstrates not only the power of folklore to keep a terrorist organization alive even when it was dormant, but also the resilience of a group many previously believed to be spent.

The relative success of the IRA appears to lie in the way it characterizes its cause. Folklore, meaning the traditions, beliefs, myths, and tales of a people, can be used to great effect, particularly when combined with the power of symbolism. The IRA has used symbols extensively by lifting one figure, emblem, legend, or even color from Irish folklore and employing it to evoke a sense of pride and patriotism, thus tying their cause to a powerful sense of Irishness. Conversely, it would also use such symbols to mask its more violent activities – as is exemplified by the use of Irish colors and emblems on its fundraising websites. Terrorism's psychological impact is largely where its strength lies and, when a group portrays its behaviour as something related to a nation's folklore, violence is psychologically easier to digest than if the organization did not try to conceal its violent tactics.¹⁸

Unlike many terrorist organizations, the IRA invests much of its effort in managing public relations. This may seem paradoxical. After all, any group that is prepared to resort to "barbaric maimings" and car-bombings may appear unlikely to court public opinion.¹⁹ However, from the group's inception, its leadership has used patriotism as a means to tap into nationalism, which has helped it build support intermestically. Its use of Irish symbols, the figures of its leaders, and folklore have enabled the group to make supporting it synonymous with being a good Celt and a good Catholic. Furthermore, its political wing, Sinn Féin, ("one and the same organization" as the Provisional IRA) allows the group to negotiate with governments whilst maintaining their simultaneous paramilitary campaign.²⁰ Indeed, the existence of a political party dedicated to the IRA's cause allows governments to save face, in that they do not outwardly appear to be pandering to terrorists. It is worth pondering how the world's media would have responded to President Clinton meeting with someone openly allied to the IRA, rather than Gerry Adams, the leader of Sinn Féin, with whom he met on many occasions.

The IRA's concessions to public perception provide quite a contrast to the senseless, widespread terror campaign of Peru's Sendero Luminoso, but the violence of the IRA should not be forgotten. Sinn Féin's official logo epitomizes the IRA's tactic of the use of Irish symbols to reinforce the cause of Irish national liberation: the insignia consists of a green map of Ireland tied together with green and white ribbon—thus evoking visually both the Irish flag and the idea of reunifying the island. The effectiveness of symbols to reinforce a cause has been studied extensively. David Altheide holds that “symbols make messages assimilable by reducing their originality, the degree to which they complicate cognitions, and the degree to which they lessen ability to predict.”²¹ A culture as rich as that of Ireland, with its leprechauns, shamrocks, harps, and the ever-present color green, is something of a gift to an organization that has embraced folklore as an ideology of national liberation. That is to say, for an Irish terrorist organization, it is understandably preferable to be associated with a four-leafed clover rather than a bloody knife or a car bomb. This fact is particularly relevant when the organization engages in fundraising.

It is worth considering whether a terrorist organization based in any other country could succeed by using its nation's folklore (that is, without other reinforcing factors). Indeed, what Michael Collins called his “Q Division” of the Irish Republican Brotherhood (the group's American branch), stands as a testament to the power of Irish culture to transcend, not just state borders, but the Atlantic Ocean at a time when international travel and globalization were scarcely imaginable.²² In binding its cause so tightly to Irish culture, the IRA initially sought to portray themselves as Ireland's army, acting in the interests of the people. This meant that people were unlikely to dismiss them as a loose affiliation of thugs (as has happened to other groups engaged in political violence). Townshend explains the IRA's self-image:

Self-belief is fuelled by potent historical legend... producing a robust faith in the cause; backed by a belief that the essential unity and fraternity of the Irish people is only fractured by deliberate British interference.²³

This powerful self-belief, together with the leadership's ability to export it to their target-audience, help account for the IRA's longevity and once more solidifies the place of Irish history and legend in its ideology.

Today, the organization continues to draw on the world's active Irish diaspora. Although the 1880s dynamite campaign by the Clan na Gael brought "direct Irish-American violent action in Britain to a surprisingly complete end," the ideology of Irish liberation still appeals in the United States.²⁴ IRA fundraising activities in the United States made international headlines when 9/11 brought terrorism under a brighter spotlight. Altheide claims that "[t]he way something is communicated can affect subsequent definitions, interpretations, and actions."²⁵ An organization known as Noraid serves as a sound example of this notion. A number of groups claiming to be affiliated with this organization assert their support of "Catholics in Northern Ireland and those USA Catholics oppressed in their struggle for freedom and equal representation." All of the groups, many part of the more official looking "Irish Northern Aid, Incorporated —the Voice of Irish Republicanism in America," (strongly backed by the Sinn Féin leadership), target the Irish-American community for funding. Their homepage is peppered with Celtic imagery and, naturally, the color green. One Noraid-affiliated website in particular contains the following morsel:

One must ask if the Irish in America can be of much help to the Irish in Northern Ireland in their struggle for Liberty and Justice while in their own country... freedoms are hanging by a thin thread.²⁶

By playing on somewhat exaggerated problems in the home of its targeted audience, the organization hopes to gain greater backing.

The location of Noraid's donation boxes may be the most significant fact of all. Green collection tins were placed in Irish theme pubs in predominantly Irish-American areas, such as Boston and New York, both environments where Irish identity is emphasized. Perhaps it is not so difficult to be persuaded by such schemes. Irish Northern Aid, Inc.'s mission statement includes references to "Brit-

ish misrule”²⁷ and their homepage includes various calls for Irish-Americans to help out their motherland. Martin McGuinness, Sinn Féin’s chief negotiator, is quoted as saying, “Irish Americans in particular will have a key role... The political, moral and economic support of Irish Americans would be key, in the long term, in the transition to a united Ireland.”²⁸

If not a call to arms, this statement is, at the very least, a call to check books. As terrorism scholar Jonathan White notes, “Terrorists understand the power of the Internet and its potential as a force multiplier.”²⁹ The IRA, and other groups associated with it, plays on the vast number of Irish emblems and folklore in order to tie the websites advocating its vision for Ireland to a greater sense of ‘Irishness’.

One of the main underlying components of Ireland’s turbulent history is religion, but the IRA cannot be categorized as ‘holy terrorists’ in the same manner as Al Qaeda and their ilk. Although the stormy relationship between Protestantism and Catholicism has undoubtedly caused much conflict and devastation over the years, the IRA is primarily a nationalist organization and, for it, religion has been more of a means to end. That is, the group pursues nationalist goals in the name of religion. The date alone of the 1916 Easter uprising signifies just how important religion has been to the IRA’s nationalist cause. A participant in this rebellion recalls the connection of the rebellion to religious duty:

There was hardly a man in the Volunteer ranks who did not prepare for death on Easter Saturday, and there were many who felt... that they were doing no more than fulfilling their Easter duty.³⁰

As one theorist explains, “ideologies operate to order the world, but they are mediated by organizations and technology which themselves alter possibilities even as they operate according to their own logic.”³¹ In Ireland’s case, the IRA has used religion, together with folklore, to foster a sense of Irishness. More recently, the Catholic civil rights movement of the 1960s cemented the place of religion in Ireland’s national liberation. One IRA leader, Patrick Pearse, was

a strong proponent of tying the IRA's cause to religion: "they justified their actions in religious terms, and their leaders, most notably Padraic Pearse, expressed their aims in terms of messianic Catholicism."³² Moreover, their target support base has always been Ireland's working-class Catholics, who, especially in Pearse's day, were "strongly attached to the Church."³³ By capitalizing on the power of religion to engage the masses, the IRA 'marketed' Catholicism as part of its nationalist ideology. On an almost subconscious level, people were made to embrace nationalist sentiment as part of a religious cause.

Pearse was instrumental, not only in solidifying the IRA's nationalist goals, but in bringing Catholicism to the fore in the organization: "Pearse was first and foremost a devout Catholic...[n]o understanding of his politics is possible without grasping this."³⁴ For him, "Catholicism was central to Irish nationalism," and he preached this to the organization's target audience.³⁵ Pearse was a vehement advocate of the idea that Irish culture was somehow superior, saying, "Ireland not free merely, but Gaelic also."³⁶ The great symbolism of launching the Easter Rebellion of 1916 from Dublin's General Post Office (an imposing building, which today still stands on the city's O'Connell Street) was the brainchild of Pearse. Such was his devotion to the cause of Republicanism that Pearse "believed it was necessary to sacrifice his life to keep the Republican spirit alive."³⁷ In doing this, Pearse enabled his newly formed IRA to hold him up as a martyr for the Irish cause in the face of British rule. Interestingly, the actions of Pearse (and his colleague, James Connolly), did not play to the IRA's advantage until after the men's deaths. It was only with Britain's crackdown "on all expressions of Republicanism," that the Irish came to support the IRA and to revere the men who started it.³⁸

Many revolutionary and terrorist organizations have used the cult of personality to great effect. In terms of leadership, it is difficult to imagine Communist revolution in China without a Chairman Mao, or in Cuba without a Ché Guevara or a Fidel Castro. The power of personality can be used to great effect, even when a particular figure is deceased, jailed, or, in the case of mythical figures,

never even existed. The role of personalities in the Irish nationalist movement dates back as far as the early days of the Irish Republican Brotherhood. Indeed, its members were colloquially known as “Fenians”—a name derived from a figure in Celtic mythology, Finn MacCool.³⁹ MacCool is also linked to Scottish and Welsh folklore—both countries that have struggled against the English—and was famed for his bravery and chivalry in the fight for justice.⁴⁰ In a contemporary context, it is fascinating to see the great number of Irish-themed pubs using MacCool’s name—an unexpected example of the continuing popularity of myth in Irish culture today.

Significantly, the legend of MacCool holds that he belonged to a group of militiamen who considered themselves to be above the law. Finn MacCool challenged the men to act chivalrously and to become the champions of the Irish people. Given that the IRA often sought to portray itself as a people’s army, the MacCool myth was particularly fitting. The role of leadership in any organization cannot be underestimated. Theorist and revolutionary, Frantz Fanon, was certainly a proponent of strong leadership:

When the political leader summons the people to a meeting, there could be said to be blood in the air... The excitement that is fostered, however – the comings and goings, the speechmaking, the crowds, the police presence, the military might, the arrests and the deportation of leaders – all this agitation gives the people the impression the time has come for them to do something.⁴¹

In many ways, this description fits well with the violent scenes in Cork, Dublin, and Belfast during the War of Independence of 1919–1921. In such desperate circumstances, the appeal of a leader showing people the way to behave must surely be heightened. As Bowden explains, “one vital revolutionary lesson the Irish learned... was that a nation which is to succeed in modern war has to convince its people that the cause is worthy of martyrdom,” and Patrick Pearse was probably best-placed to do this.⁴²

Carlos Marighella, himself a revolutionary, believed that, “As soon as a reasonable portion of the population begins to take seriously the actions of the urban guerrilla, his success is guaranteed.”⁴³ This serves

to support the idea that credibility is vital to the success of a leader and his or her movement. Michael Collins is one figure who will remain inextricably linked to the Irish Republican Army's early days. Collins' ability to build support and spur mobilization has been mimicked by various other would-be revolutionaries. At the IRA's helm from 1919, Collins, who had studied the tactics of the recent Russian revolution, encouraged Republicans to use, "bombs, murders, [and] ambushes," to combat the British. Collins constituted a figurehead for the Irish cause during the war of independence, but was also a figurehead for modern terrorism.⁴⁴ The idea of myth and symbols strengthening leadership has been subject to much discourse:

Leadership can assume greater stature, more legitimacy and perhaps even more political currency as a result of having the symbolic coin challenged. It is the mission and the challenge which is emphasized and *not the adequacy* of the leadership.⁴⁵

Not only an inspiration to the Irish cause, the cult of personality surrounding Collins was powerful enough to appeal to terrorists fighting for different causes worldwide. This in itself is a testament to the power of myth.

The idea that "terrorists are good communicators; they understand the media," is central to the IRA's philosophy.⁴⁶ In the wake of 9/11, the organization seems to have realized that bombings no longer play well in the media, and certainly not in the American media. After all, the widespread violence at the time of the organization's inception would likely have been less well received given the immediacy that modern technology provides. Today, the IRA subscribes to the notion that it is far more productive to raise funds on their green and orange-colored websites and engage in political negotiations than to detonate explosives in crowded towns and cities. It is notable, for example, that the U.S. State Department's list of "significant terrorist incidents" records a distinct lack of IRA bombings following 9/11, whereas from the period of 1961 to 2001, the list details a plethora of car bombs attributed to the IRA and its splinter groups.⁴⁷

Many assert a link between the conspicuous lack of IRA attacks and America's changing view of terrorism in the aftermath of September 11. Conor Cruise O'Brien sees the IRA's renunciations of violence over recent years as an effort "to prevent the severing of its vital fundraising links with sympathetic Irish-Americans following September 11... It does not represent an enduring breakthrough: it is simply a tactical ploy."⁴⁸ The importance of publicity to terrorist groups cannot be underestimated: "One Algerian Jihadist once said that he would rather kill one European in front of a camera than kill a hundred in a desert."⁴⁹ Although spoken by a different kind of terrorist, these words are applicable to many violent groups. Manipulation of the media is a key tool, or 'force multiplier,' for political activists. While most terrorist groups, including the IRA, use carnage and destruction to demonstrate the seriousness of their cause, such devastation would have a diminished impact if the media was not present to broadcast the pictures all over the world. After all, "television and the Internet give terrorists an immediate international audience."⁵⁰ Terrorism is "made for television. Its life-and-death drama unfolds in ways that demand attention, and television reporters gravitate toward it."⁵¹

The IRA makes heavy use of the so-called infotainment telesector.⁵² It, like other terrorist groups, plays on an interdependent relationship with the media.⁵³ Indeed, the group was a pioneer of using symbolic targets. In detonating Dublin's 'Nelson's Pillar,' the IRA evoked a heightened reaction for three reasons: the attack took place exactly fifty years after the Easter Rising, the Pillar stood opposite the General Post Office (where Pearse and Connolly began the Rebellion), and Admiral Nelson (for whom the monument stood) represents a powerful symbol of British power.⁵⁴ More recently, London's Heathrow Airport was targeted three times by the IRA in March 1994.⁵⁵ The airport is important to the British economy and disruption to it revealed a weakness in Britain's ability to protect itself. There was added symbolism in the fact the Queen was due to land there just a day or two following the attacks. These events demonstrate not only the IRA's use of Irish folklore, but its use of British symbols to reveal weakness in its enemy. The impact of both of these events would have been diminished without media

coverage. Shane Kingston's study of how the IRA used the media to present itself positively during the 1990s highlights how the Republican group would not claim responsibility for attacks, thus revealing some level of regard for the power of the media to make or break their cause.⁵⁶ When a terrorist organization uses the popular culture of shamrocks and Baileys in an attempt to make their cause more palatable, the importance of the media is further heightened.

Over the years, the IRA has embraced a number of tactics – both violent and peaceful—to further their goals for Ireland, but few have proved quite as effective, or as intriguing, as their manipulation of Irish myth and folklore. The organization has, in effect, embraced Irish culture in order to shift the focus of the masses away from its terrorist attacks to a greater sense of national pride. The IRA stands as an example of just how well an organization can mold a nation's culture to suit its aims. Indeed, such is its success in this that the ideology and tradition of one country has been used to gain support from citizens of others. The Irish culture is a very marketable one. There is scarcely a city in the world that is without a bustling Irish theme pub and it is difficult to think of another nationality that could make a similar claim. Alan Dershowitz asserts that in order to eliminate terrorism the international community must “make terrorism a losing proposition.”⁵⁷ In the IRA's case, their use of Irish folklore creates a disinclination among their target audience to recognise the link between a patriotic green Noraid website and the bloody scenes following IRA attacks. Therefore, as an ideology of national liberation, the organization's use of folklore has helped them to construct and maintain a support base.

It must be remembered that folklore and myth have not been used *directly* to achieve independence, but to gain support for such a goal. They say that everyone is Irish on March 17th, but perhaps not as many rush to wear their Guinness-shaped hats on August 15th (the date of the Omagh bombing in 1998) or on July 20th (the day the IRA bombed Hyde Park in 1982). Theorists and scholars alike search for explanations as to how individuals can be driven to commit the bloody acts that terrorism entails; indeed, such attacks demonstrate the dirtiest side of war. The Irish Republican Army has proven that folklore and the cult of personality surrounding

a leader can be used to bolster support for its cause and to mask its brutal tactics. Furthermore, it has shown how, by manipulating public perceptions, donating to a terrorist organization can be portrayed as an act of patriotism rather than a contribution to a campaign of violence.

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Fighting For Freedom

The Conflict of Chechnya and the Russian “War on International Terror”

LINDSEY WILKINS



“Not every Chechen is a terrorist and the Chechens’ legitimate aspirations for a political solution should be pursued by the Russian government” — National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice

In 1991, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Chechnya declared independence from Russia. This secessionist movement, however, was met with a violent response by the Russian government, resulting in a devastating war in December 1994. The Russian army, untrained and undisciplined, used brutal methods to subdue the Chechen separatists which changed the tactics of Chechen forces and resulted in an exponential escalation of the conflict on both sides. In response to the brutal tactics of the Russian army, a minority of Chechen separatists resorted to a ruthless campaign of guerilla warfare and terrorism. These Chechen forces shocked and demoralized the Russian public by launching localized terrorist attacks on ‘Russian territory’ during the latter part of the first Chechen War.

After nearly two years of fighting, the first Chechen war had resulted in the death of tens of thousands.¹ Despite a ground invasion and massive bombings of Chechen cities and villages, the Russian armed forces failed to defeat the guerillas. The Khasavyurt Accord was thus signed in 1996 by the newly elected Chechen president, Aslan Maskhadov, deferring resolution of Chechnya's status until the year 2001 and ending the first Chechen War.²

Chechnya had gained *de facto* independence; however, three years later, a second Chechen War was declared by Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. In August of 1999, terrorists led by opponents of Maskhadov invaded neighboring Dagestan to liberate the region from Russian rule and declare it an Islamic republic.³ Despite the fact that the terrorists had no connection with Maskhadov, Putin blamed Chechnya for cultivating international Islamic terrorism. He declared that Russia was "dealing with direct intervention of international terrorism against Russia"⁴ and that "international Islamic terrorism was the driving force of Chechnya's secessionist movement."⁵ The Russian Prime Minister also stated that Chechnya could not be independent from Russia because its separation would threaten the security of the Russian Federation. He remarked, "I was convinced that if we didn't stop the extremists right away, we'd be facing a second Yugoslavia on the entire territory of the Russian Federation—the Yugoslavization of Russia."⁶

Islamic terrorism connected to Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda network posed a threat to the entire Eurasian region, yet links between the Chechen separatists and international terrorism were not clear. Despite this, Putin used the fear of previous Chechen terrorist attacks and the invasion of Dagestan in 1999 to justify the redeployment of troops into Chechnya. Chechnya's secession from the Russian Federation was put on hold, and many more civilians lost their lives. Chechen separatists that did not support the use of terrorist tactics were subsequently punished and their goals were assimilated into the goals of Islamic extremists within the region.⁷ This article will investigate the cause and development of the conflict between Chechnya and Russia and will determine whether the predominant goals of separatists should be linked to those of international Islamic extremist groups, such as the *jihadists* led by Osama bin Laden.

Was the Moscow government justified in its decision to declare war against international Islamic terrorism?

Chechnya's struggle for political independence has been shaped by a long history of struggle against Russian control, which dates back to the Caucasian Wars of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The Chechen fight against feudal Russia for the creation of an Islamic state was led by heroic figures such as Sheikh Mansur in the late 1700s and Imam Shamil in the early 1800s. These two dedicated separatists hoped to establish a Transcaucasus state under shari'a law, but failed due to the strength of the Russian Empire. Despite their failure, the heroic symbolism of these early Chechen freedom fighters continues to serve as a rallying point for twentieth century Chechen rebels.

The rise of Bolshevik power and the repression of nationalism by Joseph Stalin were also factors contributing to the Russian-Chechen conflict. During the 1905 and 1917 revolutions in Russia, Chechens rebelled against the state. However, their declaration of independence was quickly put down by the Bolshevik Red Army. Stalin, who at the time was serving as Nationalities Commissar for the Communist Party, hatched a scheme to suppress and divide the restive Chechen population:

He embedded enough ethnic, linguistic, and religious contradictions into the political geography so as to preoccupy the locals and ensure that Moscow's firm hand would be required to maintain order....natural enemies were forced to live side by side.⁸

In other words, Stalin sought to subdue nationalist movements by placing many different ethnic groups together so that they would be too occupied quarreling with one other to attack or question the authority of the state. This plan backfired, however, in that ethnic groups alienated themselves from the Russian state and other surrounding ethnicities, which eventually fostered irredentism—the advocating of the annexation of territories administered by another state on the grounds of common ethnicity.

Stalin furthered these policies of alienation during World War II when he forced the entire Chechen and Ingush populations into exile. Stalin argued that the Chechens were providing assistance to

Nazi Germany, and ordered the Red Army to round up the different ethnic populations and pack them into freight cars bound for Kazakhstan and Siberia. Hundreds of thousands of men, women, and children perished during this brutal process.⁹ Having suffered through the tragedy of mass deportations from their homeland, the Chechens retained a strong sense of ethnic identity and an abiding mistrust of Russia:

The collective trauma of exile was a key formative experience for many members of the present Chechen elite, including future President Dzhokhar Dudayev, who made their way back to the Caucasus only after Nikita Khrushchev denounced the deportations in 1957...¹⁰

These elite leaders who experienced the repression of the Soviet regime would later make possible the Chechen secessionist movement that still exists today.

Thus, the repressive policies of Stalin and other Soviet leaders consolidated and reinforced the nationalist sentiments of the Chechen population prior to the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The dissolution and the subsequent fall of Soviet Communism, however, was the more immediate catalyst to the Chechen secessionist movement. A door had been opened in the late 1980s that allowed ethnic minority groups who had been deeply suppressed by imperial Russia and Socialist regimes of the Soviet Union to revolt:

Mikhail Gorbachev...initiated a program of ideological and political liberalization. As the process of reform gained momentum between 1988 and 1991, it unleashed a growing tide of national self-assertion in which the tension between the formal rhetoric of republic sovereignty and the reality of a highly centralized state produced growing pressures to give substance to the claim.¹¹

In other words, Gorbachev's reform policies of *glasnost* and *perestroika* strayed from the authoritative, centralized control that had characterized Soviet politics and left an ideological vacuum open in which nationalist movements could form. Chechen separatists were upset by the failures of the Communist Party. The hyper-centraliza-

tion and inefficiency of the political and economic systems directed by Moscow, as well as the secrecy and hypocrisy of Soviet political life, were equally upsetting.¹² Ethnically concentrated regions like Chechnya thus used nationalist discourse in an attempt to gain self-determination from the failed Soviet state. Chechens also began to form their own political structures to legitimize their right to sovereignty.

The Chechen separatist movement began with the founding of the Vainakh Democratic Party (VDP) in May 1990. The VDP leadership later organized the National Congress of Chechen People (OKChN), placing General Dzhoakhar Dudaev at its head. Dudaev led a radical faction within the party that he used to establish a broad base of political supporters. He promoted the establishment of a secular republic, independent of Russia, which would respect Chechen traditions that had been stifled by the Soviet regime.¹³ Islam was used by Dudaev to set the Russians apart; however, he had been a Soviet general and had previously fought *against* Osama bin Laden and other Islamic *mujahideen* in Afghanistan.¹⁴ For these reasons, Dudaev did not lead a separatist movement centered around holy war or *jihad*; rather, he primarily saw flaws in the Soviet state and wanted to create a new Chechen state separate from what he called a new 'neo-colonial' Russia.¹⁵

During the anti-Gorbachev coup in August of 1991, elections were held in Chechnya and Dudaev was elected president. His first act as president was to issue a declaration of the sovereignty of the Chechen Republic in November 1991. Yeltsin, however, declared that the Chechen elections were held illegally and were not accurately polled, and dispatched 2,500 interior ministry troops into the region.¹⁶ Dudaev responded by declaring martial law and mobilized his forces for defense of Chechen sovereignty. Because Mikhail Gorbachev still served as the Soviet president, the Russian parliament rescinded Yeltsin's order to use force: "Soviet television subsequently showed several hundred Russian troops leaving Grozny in tourist buses, as Chechen national guardsmen fired automatic weapons in the air in celebration."¹⁷

The dissolution of the Soviet Union in December of 1991 later permitted the fifteen constituent union republics of the USSR to

proclaim sovereignty and gain recognition by the international community. Chechens believed that they too had succeeded in gaining independence from the Soviet state and declared the creation of the Chechen Republic of Ichkheria. Dudaev sought to acquire as many arms as possible in order to maintain security throughout the region.

The new Russian Federation, ignorant of Dudaev's strength as a charismatic political leader and his ability to pose a serious threat to the Russian state, continued to refrain from taking serious action. Yeltsin, dealing with a constitutional crisis, economic reform, and rivalry with Gorbachev, was distracted by his obligations to democratically reform the Russian state and maintain control.¹⁸ With Yeltsin's attention thus diverted, Dudaev continued to build support by strengthening the power of his armed forces. Dudaev did little to politically govern the Chechen state—a previous general of the Soviet Army, he was inclined to focus more on spending money for military defense than economic and social reform.¹⁹ He had inherited a sizable arsenal that had previously belonged to the Soviets, including “40,000 automatic weapons and machine guns, 153 cannons and mortars, 42 tanks, 18 Grad multiple rocket launchers, 55 armored personnel carriers, several training aircraft and helicopters, and 130,000 grenades.”²⁰ Thus, for three years Chechnya was self-governed by Dudaev and experienced substantial military growth. Yeltsin's lack of attention to the Chechen situation was the primary reason that the Chechen forces were able to grow as strong as they did.

Fruitless talks between Chechnya and Russia failed to establish a relationship between the two regions. In 1994, prior to Yeltsin's reelection, the reaction of the Russian leadership to the Chechen conflict changed drastically from contrived indifference to the initiation of a full-scale military invasion.²¹ On December 10, Yeltsin ordered Russian armed forces to invade the Republic of Chechnya. Yeltsin, looking to consolidate his authority for the upcoming presidential elections, thought of the Chechen conflict as any easy victory that would demonstrate his leadership and power:

This was Yeltsin's private war because the government did not declare war and the parliament did not declare war. The entire

war was carried out according to the commands and decrees of one political figure.²²

During Yeltsin's televised appeal to the Russian public of his reasoning for the invasion, he stated that negotiations with the Chechens between 1991 and 1994 were impossible because of the threat the Chechens posed to the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation:

Our aim is to find a political solution to the problem of one of the components of the Russian Federation—the Chechen Republic—and to protect its citizens from armed extremism. But at present the impending danger of a full-scale war in the Chechen Republic stands in the way of peace talks and the free expression of the Chechen people's will.²³

The invasion of Chechnya, also known as the “New Year's Eve” attack, was poorly planned and the Russian soldiers lacked sufficient weapons, training, or maps of Grozny.²⁴ Yeltsin's decision to invade had been hastily made, and it quickly became apparent that the Russian army was not prepared for counter-insurgency warfare against highly armed and motivated guerillas. The invasion turned out to be a military failure and the first attempt by federal troops to seize Grozny was disastrous. The Chechen separatists had won the battle.²⁵

Russian tactics, however, were soon revised. Russian control of Grozny was finally won in February 1995 after a heavy aerial and artillery bombardment reduced most of the city to rubble, killing thousands of civilians:

The massive aerial bombardment of Grozny at the beginning of January, ostensibly to ‘flush out’ rebel fighters, led to large-scale civilian casualties, many of whom were ethnic Russians. Thousands were trapped in the devastated city, hiding in basements, unable to escape.²⁶

Later in that year, after the capture of the city of Grozny, Russian troops sought to disarm Dudaev's army and flush the freedom fighters out of the rural towns and villages where many of them

were hiding. The process of capturing and punishing Chechen rebels, however, resulted in thousands of civilian deaths and myriad human rights violations. Security sweeps, called *Zachistki*, were conducted by Russian troops to weed rebels out of the population, and resulted in the beatings, torture, and killing.²⁷ At the village of Samashki, for instance, where most of the Grozny refugees had fled, MVD troops (internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs) stormed the village on April 6, 1995 in search of separatist fighters. Dudaev's men could not be found, and the MVD troops began "cleansing" the village house by house:

The 'clean-up' operation was executed with savage ferocity over a 24-hour period, as the Russian troops went on the rampage, leaving at least 103 civilians dead and nearly 200 homes burned. Many of those killed were elderly people shot at point-blank range. The MVD then sealed off the village for three days and refused to permit anyone to enter or to leave, even denying access to the Red Cross.²⁸

The aerial bombing of Grozny and the attacks on villages like Samashki could not be justified as legitimate tactics of professional warfare. The Russian army persecuted and tortured anyone they believed to be supporting Dudaev's freedom fighters. Yeltsin had begun the war stating that peaceful negotiations could not be conducted between Russia and Chechnya because civilians' lives were at risk due to "armed extremism."²⁹ The war in Chechnya, however, demonstrated that the Russian army was just as violent and indifferent to the lives of civilians as Chechen extremists. The war also split the political establishment in Moscow, damaging the democratic governance that Yeltsin had initially planned to build: "Both houses of the Federal Assembly and most army officers were opposed to the war, while even the secret services were said to have privately advised against military intervention."³⁰ Public support for the war in Chechnya was weak, as "seventy-five per cent of the Russian people came out in opposition to the war in a poll taken shortly after the fall of Grozny."³¹

The brutal invasion of Grozny and the surrounding countryside also intensified the conflict by further angering the freedom fighters.

The Chechen people became aware that their cause was desperate; their fight for secession from Russia grew stronger because they assumed that the Russian government was seeking to end the existence of a Chechen state, as it had done under Stalin. Chechens began to make plans to defend themselves against the Russian army. In response to the loss of friends and loved ones in the Russian *zachistky* operations, young embittered Chechens armed themselves with rifles and slipped into the forested mountains and southern highlands of Chechnya declaring *kanlis*, or blood feuds, on the Russian Federal forces.³²

In reaction to the Russian army's massacre in Samashki, Shamil' Basayev, a Chechen warlord who had been a computer salesman and former firefighter in the Soviet army, led a raid two months later on the Russian town of Budennovsk. Basayev's forces stated that they had intended to attack a military target, but failing in that attempt, they had instead seized a Budennovsk hospital, taking more than a thousand hostages.³³ After several days of failed negotiations, Basayev demanded safe passage for his troops. Russian forces tried to storm the hospital and fired at the rebels, killing more than 100 Russian civilians. Yeltsin was in a summit meeting in Nova Scotia, so serious peace talks were finally held between Prime Minister Chernomyrdin and Basayev, resulting in the release of the hostages and Basayev's men. Basayev had succeeded in forcing the Russian government to negotiate and had embarrassed the Russian army; in addition, Basayev's defiance ignited Chechen morale.

Thus, in 1996, Chechen armed forces and guerrillas regained control of Grozny and Chechnya, defeating Yeltsin's army. The defeat was a result of the loss of support within the Russian Army itself, as soldiers saw that the reasons for being in Chechnya were based on Yeltsin's lies and that the mass killings of civilians were unjustified.³⁴ Yeltsin's human-rights adviser wrote a letter asking, "Why was the President quiet for three years about the situation in Chechnya and then sent bombers?"³⁵ Popular opposition to the war was widespread and, after Dudaev's assassination by the Russian army in April 1996, Yeltsin signed the Khasavyurt Accord on August 31, 1996. This gave the new Chechen President, Alsan Maskhadov, legitimate control over the region.

Maskhadov's presidency, however, angered many Chechen separatists, Basayev in particular, who felt he had contributed greatly to the Chechen war and deserved to be the new leader. Despite this opposition, Maskhadov "secured an easy victory, winning 59.3 percent of the vote against 23.5 percent for Basayev."³⁶

After the withdrawal of Russian forces in late 1996, Maskhadov faced the difficult task of restoring normality to the Chechen republic. Maskhadov had to pick up the pieces of an economically destitute republic that had become corrupted by internal conflict between various clans and warlords during the first Chechen War. Even so, Maskhadov was viewed positively by the Russian government. He declared that he was not as dogmatic as Dudaev and believed that "all disputes should be solved peacefully and soberly."³⁷ Maskhadov was a moderate figure interested in asserting Chechnya's independence, but within the framework of economic and political cooperation with Russia.³⁸

On May 12, 1997, Maskhadov met with Yeltsin in Moscow and agreed to peace and cooperation with the Russian state. This was a crucial breakthrough in Russo-Chechen relations considering that Yeltsin had consistently refused to meet with Dudaev.³⁹ As time progressed, however, Russia failed to meet its reconstruction and economic obligations to Chechnya, undermining Maskhadov's legitimacy and effectiveness in Chechnya:

The economy had been destroyed and there were very few legitimate jobs, schools and hospitals were all closed and pensions and wages went unpaid. The lack of any legitimate means of making a living pushed many towards crime in order to survive in a republic awash with weapons.⁴⁰

Some guerilla fighters decided to take action, and under the guidance of Basayev and Khattab brought attention back to reforming Chechnya, insisting that the creation of an Islamic state was necessary because it had been the goal of Dudaev and past Chechen heroes.⁴¹ In response, Maskhadov did what he could to subdue Islamic extremists throughout the Chechen region, but felt incapable of controlling leaders like Basayev without support from the Russian government.

Russian general and politician Aleksandr Lebed "blamed Moscow for not having taken advantage of the opportunity offered by the peace agreement that he and Maskhadov signed in late August 1996 to stabilize the political and economic situation in Chechnya and the neighboring North Caucasus republics."⁴²

Control by Basayev and Khattab thus grew and on August 2, 1999, separatists from Chechnya invaded the Russian republic of Dagestan. Basayev and Khattab were bent on creating a union between Chechnya and Dagestan under Islamic rule; however, this insurrection was defeated by the Dagestani government with help from the Russian army. Russian troops forced the withdrawal of the Chechen rebels in September with the loss of 1,500 lives, including 270 Russians.⁴³

Concurrently, during the first two weeks of September, several Russian apartment complexes were destroyed by bombings in Dagestan, Moscow, and in Volgodonsk, killing approximately 300 Russian civilians. Suspicions naturally fell on Chechens. However, on September 22, residents of an apartment building called the police after catching members of the FSB, the successor to the KGB, planting hexogen bombs in the Russian town of Ryazan.⁴⁴ Such odd behavior, along with other circumstantial evidence, led to widespread suspicion that the incident had been faked by the government in order to blame Chechen terrorists and drum up support for a new war in Chechnya.⁴⁵ Why would Moscow seek to instigate another Chechen war?

The most substantial reason was that Yeltsin's regime was collapsing. In August, prior to the bombings, an international scandal broke, involving money laundering between the Bank of New York and Russian government officials, including Yeltsin and members of his family.⁴⁶ Yeltsin thus needed to immediately hand over presidential power to a handpicked successor to avoid having criminal charges brought against him, his family, and his oligarchic associates. By handing over power, and rallying support for a new leader, Yeltsin would avoid any legal charges from his opponents. Yeltsin chose Vladimir Putin as his successor because he was a loyal, strong leader and an ex-KGB officer capable of assuring Russian citizens

that he would stabilize the country, protect its territorial borders, and end terrorism.

Putin painted a picture of Chechen separatists as violent Islamic extremists; his goal was to create support both domestically and internationally for fighting "international Islamic extremism" in Chechnya to divert attention from the problems in Moscow.⁴⁷ Even though the Russian population speculated that the Russian government was responsible for atrocities against Chechen civilians, they recalled the Dagestani raids and began to believe Moscow's allegations that its Muslim highlander foes in Chechnya were fanatic terrorists.⁴⁸ A second Chechen war was abruptly declared by Putin on September 30, 1999, to consolidate his victory in the 2000 election: "In March 2000, Putin handily won election as president in his own right with 53 percent of the vote, buoyed at least in part by approval of the war in Chechnya."⁴⁹

Putin began the second war of "cleansing terrorism in Chechnya" by utterly devastating Grozny with surface-to-surface ballistic missiles, thermobaric aerial bombardments, and aerosol artillery shelling.⁵⁰

A comparison of photographs taken by satellites before and after the September-December 1999 tactical obliteration of Grozny revealed the fact that a European city of over 400,000...had literally been wiped off the face of the earth.⁵¹

Massive bombings in the area once again deepened the anger of the Chechen separatists, and the younger generation of Chechen men who had survived the previous decade of violence began joining the Chechen army in the field.⁵² Normal life in Chechnya was almost impossible amid the charred and bombed buildings and the leftover military hardware on the side of the road:

Grozny is a living hell. It is another world, some dreadful Hades you reach through the Looking Glass. There is no living civilization among the ruins—apart from the people themselves.⁵³

In 1999, U.S. presidential candidate George W. Bush, speaking of the Chechen conflict, stated that "[the Russians] need to resolve

the dispute peacefully and not be bombing women and children and causing huge numbers of refugees to flee Chechnya.”⁵⁴ Putin and his regime, however, continued to hype the threat of a Taliban-like regime in Chechnya. Throughout 2001, the Kremlin tried to link the quagmire in Chechnya to the Pashtun-Taliban theocracy, insisting that Afghanistan *mujahideen* had ties to the Chechen region; evidence was based on a Chechen dissident who was caught visiting the Taliban in Kabul in January 2000.⁵⁵ Putin, struggling to legitimize the devastating war in Chechnya, stressed to the media and the international community that evidence existed to prove that internationally sponsored terrorism was linked to the Northern Caucasus.

Furthermore, in the wake of the attacks of September 11, 2001, Russia seemed likely to avoid any further criticism of its behavior in Chechnya. The 9/11 attacks in America finally gave Putin the opportunity to gain support from the Bush administration under the guise of the war against international terrorism. Putin was quick to offer condolences to the American president and the grieving American people. Flags were flown at half-mast throughout Russia, and during the second Russo-American summit in November 2001, Putin provided the U.S. with military assistance against the Taliban in Afghanistan.⁵⁶ The primary goal of Putin’s regime was to have its Chechen enemies labeled as “Al Qaeda-linked terrorists” by the U.S. State Department so that Western observers of Russian politics would overlook the war crimes committed by the Russian government.⁵⁷

Ironically, Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov’s sympathetic reaction to the 9/11 attacks in America were posted on the Chechen website, stating:

I want to assure the USA and President G. Bush personally of our condemnation of any act directed against the population, I decisively condemn all terrorist acts, and I consider that countries which connived at the mentioned terrorist acts in the USA must inevitably be punished by the world community.⁵⁸

Despite the Chechen president’s condemnation of terrorist actions, “President Bush went on to declare that “Arab terrorists”

linked to Osama bin Laden's Al-Qaeda organization were operating on Chechen territory and ought to be "brought to justice."⁵⁹ Putin thus successfully gained the support that he needed from the U.S. government in order to continue his second war in Chechnya. The tactical importance of Russian assistance in Afghanistan was clear to the Bush administration, and as such, criticisms of the brutal Russian military actions were non-committal.⁶⁰ For a short time, Russian atrocities against the Chechens were forgotten, and Chechen separatists were labeled as foreign terrorists in the global media:

Almost overnight the anti-Russian Chechen guerillas, whose cause had been previously looked upon with reserved sympathy by Western governments and media sources, became conflated with bin Laden's anti-American terrorists by the American media and leadership.⁶¹

By 2003, the Bush administration had adopted a more balanced view, conceding that not all Chechen separatists were terrorists; only several fringe Chechen groups led by Basayev were designated as "Foreign Terrorist Operations."⁶² This strained relations between Russia and the U.S., as Putin was upset by America's change in outlook and the newly launched war in Iraq. The U.S. was also distraught by Russia's inability to seek a peaceful solution to the war in Chechnya and began to promote Mashkadov as a legitimate negotiating partner to the Kremlin.⁶³ President Putin, however, rejected any negotiations with the Chechen "terrorists."⁶⁴ Negotiations with the Chechen enemy, whom he had labeled as international terrorists and an endangerment to society, would make him appear fallible and harm his legitimacy. The war in Chechnya thus continues today.

In conclusion, Chechens have fought for centuries as separatists, seeking secession from the discriminatory and oppressive governments of Russia. The two wars in Chechnya and the brutal treatment of Chechen civilians have infuriated the Chechen population and led to the creation of terrorist organizations under leaders like

Basayev. Chechen terrorists, however, have not been clearly linked to al Qaeda and it has not been proven that Chechens wish to extend their goal of secession from Russia to a wider *jihadist* movement. The conflict of the Chechen war and the continuing Russian intervention in the region is the result of poor decision-making among the Russian elite. The second Chechen War is not actually a war on international terror; rather, it is a case of Yeltsin and Putin using nationalist sentiments to distract the public from scrutinizing the government's parochial interests and oppressive institutions.

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


NOTES FROM ABROAD

I Found Seeds in Beirut:

From Homegrown Civil Society to
Human Rights Development

YUKIKO OMAGARI '05



The features of a flower are determined by the quality of its seed. A red flower is red because the seed had information for red color. This rule exemplifies why a home-grown civil society is a seed for the advancement of a democratic society based on the will of citizens. I first came up with this idea while speaking with one of Lebanon's top human rights crusaders; I had visited Lebanon during a break from my studies in Kuwait this winter. He believes that a concrete relationship exists between a result and its origin: peace is as a result of peaceful factors, not war; a democracy originates as a result of democratic factors, not through an imposed decision. Thus, if we demand democracy that is best suited to a local society, then democratization should also originate in local society, depending on its local culture and its specific needs.

This idea that developed during my work in Washington College's International Studies Program has occupied my thoughts after graduation. During the opportunities I experienced in those four years, I began to value two factors as important components of the well-being of people's lives: the development of civil society and human rights. A home-grown civil society is a main factor in democracy because it can respond to the will of the people, and

thus it should be regarded as a more important component than the systematic, legal determinants of democracy, such as constitutions, laws, and the organization of government.

Human rights have become a priority in the recognition of democratic society. Human rights for society's weakest members, which I focus on the most, will improve as a result of the development of local civil society, because civil organizations can sensitively respond to the social needs of those who often suffer the most, and can reach out to the most vulnerable elements of society. Only when human rights of the vulnerable improve can states be said to be advancing toward a democratic society. This is why the development of civil society, with an aim to reach out to every corner of the society, is needed for the well-being of citizens. Additionally, in order to achieve the best-fitted form of civil society according to local culture, initiatives must come from members of the local society, for there is a "concrete relationship between a result and its origin."

This belief that formed during my college years brought me to Lebanon to work with civil organizations and receive training, using a network I had built in my senior year, thanks to generous support from the Society of Junior Fellows. This year provided me with the chance to clearly contrast the current situation of the Lebanon's civil organization with its past situation. I was involved with the Insan Association, a grassroots organization established to improve the socio-cultural situation in Beirut's poor suburbs. I also observed the Training Programme on Human Rights and Good Governance in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), sponsored by the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) and jointly organized by the Foundation for Human and Humanitarian Rights (FHHR), Lebanon, and the Raoul Wallenberg Institute of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, Lund University, Sweden.

Projects of the Insan Association diversified and grew in quality. Most importantly, Insan School, a project started in October 2005, now has more beneficiaries. The project helps children of refugee and migrant families to integrate into a standard education system; apparently, this is the first specialized school for children of refugees and migrants in Arabic countries, according to a journal-

ist employed by the major Arabic media who was unable to find a similar project within the region.¹ The number of children in the school doubled in one year and demand is still growing, so much so that the project cannot meet all the needs of refugee and migrant families in Beirut's suburbs. I helped to improve the academic and life skills of the children, who had faced various problems at home and at former schools due to racial discrimination, language difficulties, financial problems, and other obstacles. The organization actively supports not only the children but also their families, especially refugee families, who face serious legal problems and whose human rights have been violated, either in their country of origin or in Lebanon.

I observed an overall improvement in the project. I saw changes in the children on a daily basis, even though I joined the program a year into its existence. Some major improvements in the program include: 1) smaller classes and more volunteers; 2) divisions of classes according to their academic levels, not necessarily by age, a change made possible by the first improvement; 3) usage of textbooks and notebooks; 4) availability of the playground. The first and second improvements have allowed close attention to be paid to each child. Next, textbooks not only advance the children's reading and writing skills, but also remind them of their own academic development, enabling the children to trace their works and take pride in their achievements. Fourth, the playground provides the children not only with a place for physical activities, but also a with social ground where they make their own rules for games and try to solve problems among themselves.

In addition to the school project, the Association started a new program called Insan House, which is a shelter for the most vulnerable children who feel as if they have been abandoned by their families. In addition, the Association has started to gather more attention and recognition from the outside world. During my stay, the Ambassador of Austria, a French journalist, and a Lebanese

¹ They are non-Palestinian refugees. The children's original nationalities vary, many are from Sudan and other countries in Africa, and others are from Philippine and Sri Lanka.

researcher all visited the Insan School. The Association also cooperates with the Rotary Club and a major computer company, who help to teach computer skills to poor children.

Cooperation between the civil society and the government across the country can be advanced by holding training sessions where people can freely express their opinions. I personally observed the Training Programme on Human Rights and Good Governance sponsored by SIDA.² The remarkable point of the Training Programme was the diversity of the participants who gathered in Beirut to learn practical, uniform approaches to defending human rights and cultivating good governance in the MENA region. There were representatives from NGOs and international organizations, government officials, academics, and journalists, including young officials from the newly-created Ministry of Human Rights in Iraq. Building a network among these fields of experts that extends across national borders should strengthen *local* civil society that supports *universal* human rights.

In the meantime, several challenges exist in the realm of civil society. One is to find and choose funds that fit each program in a way that benefits those in need. Therefore, diversifying resources for funding according to the kind of project will be useful in reaching the objectives of the different projects, while taking into consideration sponsors' interests. Civil organizations need to carefully examine what the sponsors' purposes and interests are, since their criteria for recipients often depend on national interests or the policies of other sponsoring organizations. The best course is not to follow the foreign policy of others but to be selective in choosing the best kind of funds to benefit a targeted, vulnerable population. Civil organizations must be main actors and strive to be proactive, rather than passive, in order to develop a home-grown civil society.

For instance, the Insan Association has tried to find new financial resources to accommodate a growing demand from the community.

²This was realized by the generosity of the organizer of the Programme.

We found that aid from the United States would not go to the Association because it does not seek the “reform” of the country. We also examined the possibility of funding from SIDA; however, we learned that its priority is to enhance regional cooperation, not necessarily to focus on grassroots organizations. The Association does, however, meet the Japanese government’s criteria for developmental aid, which accommodates non-profit organizations as long as they seek to bring about sustainable social and economic development of the poor community on the grassroots level. The Association has already received funds from an NGO based in Austria that also works to improve the education of children. In the meantime, the FHHR’s activity fits within the priorities of SIDA, which has made it possible for the organization to manage the Training Programme on human rights in the MENA region.

The next challenge is to build a sound relationship between civil society and government officials, judges, and international political organizations like the United Nations. According to human rights defenders in the MENA region who participated in the Training Programme, building a relationship with the government is a difficult challenge, but has great potential to advance the cause of civil society.

These challenges also represent chances. They are potential factors that can further the advance of civil society initiated by local populations, which will secure human rights for society’s vulnerable members and manage projects according to local situation and culture in a timely manner. Additionally, this will lead to a democratic society based on the will of the citizens in the long term. The purpose of these factors is not to reject unified global governance or foreign development aids, but to allow civil societies to be critical actors who decide how to use global and foreign systems and their diverse resources according to the needs of local societies. A flower’s color can be brighter than the original color of its seed if it is enriched by fertilizers.

One of the children of a refugee family, who had not been able to go to school for five years, said, “I want to be a doctor.” Another

said to me, "I want to be a teacher." Still another told me, "I want to be a pharmacist." It is the responsibility of the civil society that is involved in the daily lives of such children to cultivate a soil that will allow these small seeds to flower.



Noise From Hong Kong

NICOLE IDANNA ALPERT '05



Hong Kong reverberates. From my apartment, I can hear the click clack of Mahjong tiles and winner's glee. At the beach, the waves lapping against the fishing boat buoys couple with the echoes of the freighters' distant horns. Departing from the New Territories, the peninsula connecting Hong Kong to Mainland China, the noise only grows: the soft thunder of non-stop transportation, the quick pace of sole's click-clacking, the boisterous chatter of the bar district, the cacophony of merchants advertising. Hong Kong is a hectic, insanely noisy place. And what else to expect from a population of 6.9 million squeezed vertically into an allotment six times the size of Washington, D.C.? The United Kingdom officially occupied the land in 1841, and much later, in the winter of 1984, Hong Kong was officially named the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR) in an agreement with the People's Republic of China. In July of 1997, Hong Kong ceased its existence as a colony and was handed over to the Chinese Government. The Western influence left its mark, and when globalization spread to the East, Hong Kong felt its effects. Both cultures coexist in Hong Kong, the only place where the West truly meets the East.

Some of the most notable differences between the West and the East are listed here, generalized to a fault. Concerning the past, the West wants to move beyond it, almost removing it from memory. In contrast, the East respects the past and holds onto it. Parents in the West are seen as obstacles that must be broken away from in order to become an individual, whereas the East sees the relationship between child and parent as never ending and deferential. The West views nature as a force to be conquered, fought, and controlled, while the East seeks peace with nature, living beneath it. Love is pursued tirelessly and passionately in the West, and in the East, it is peacefully earned.

But, there is one particular, rather than over-generalized, difference that is most interesting and unique. Parts of the Chinese culture are extremely superstitious. During the New Year celebrations, partakers can shake thin bamboo sticks with numbers on them contained in an open canister. The first stick to escape the bunch tells of one's fortune. If the number is lucky, you will be fortunate, if not...maybe it is best to stop putting faith in the bamboo sticks. Supposedly, seventy percent of the sticks have numbers that represent bad luck, otherwise, one merchant admits, there would be no business. Our faces and hands also have luck written all over them. Big, fleshy ears are good for racetrack betters, a lion's lips are considered lucky, and a monkey's nose unlucky. Double-digit numbers mean double the blessings and great luck, while single digit numbers express loneliness and lack luck. The single number 5 is lucky, however, and is associated with love and respect; the number 9, also considered lucky, is related to longevity and the gateway to heaven. Facial moles are also lucky, especially if located in the mid-forehead. Of course, there are many rules, and only the best fortunetellers know them all. Fortune in China is synonymous with luck, and some say the quest for fortune is in Chinese blood, which could be why some Chinese people love to gamble.

In Hong Kong, gambling in casinos is illegal, but forty miles west, a one-hour ferry ride away, is Macau SAR, another colony, formerly Portuguese, now considered a Special Administrative Region. A businessman named Stanley Ho helped make the Macau that stands today. Transformed from a fishing village into a gam-

bling center, its supposed only hope for survival was becoming a tourist attraction. Macau houses well over ten state-of-the-art casinos and has done very well for itself. It receives over sixty percent of its earnings from gambling. Because gambling is illegal in so many areas in South East Asia, Macau gets a lot of visitors and a lot of revenue. Macau is no quiet retreat—it gets noisier, neon-er, ritzier, and flashier every week. These days, the new casinos stand wrapped in bamboo scaffolding and green netting like presents to be given to Macau. Three years ago, casinos existed, but their numbers were far less. To ensure success, foreign casinos newly built have paid more attention to Eastern values so they might take a bite out of the revenue Macau is making. For instance, the basics of Feng Shui are considered so that the casinos can make its patrons feel comfortable, lucky and fortunate. Presenting Eastern values is a key consideration in attracting Chinese patrons.

Despite the differences in the culture, especially superstitious beliefs concerning luck and fortune, the capitalistic nature of Hong Kong makes it seem not so different from the rest of the world. A world-traveling friend once said, “anywhere you go in the world, you will find people are all the same.” While the culture existing on this side of the planet is a bit different, those words seem to ring true. These differences between two seemingly disparate cultures are small ‘cha siu baos’ (dim sum buns), or small potatoes, when compared to the huge link between them.

Capitalism tunnels under the differences between the East and the West, and it has taken root in Mainland China and all of China’s SARs. My favorite observer discovered, “the sights of interest in Hong Kong are all centers of finance, those with the most expensive makings.” Two International Finance Centre, Central Plaza, and the Bank of China tower are in the top running of Hong Kong’s tallest buildings, housing expensive boutiques and upscale theatres and restaurants. Hong Kong is capitalistic, not only because of its business oriented history and nature, but because of its people. Ask any Hong Kong tourist their plans during their vacation in Hong Kong, and they will enthusiastically tell you, “go shopping!” Most Cantonese people—that is, Hong Kong residents (‘Cantonese’ is derived from the name of a South Eastern province in China, Guangdong,

also known as Canton)—love to shop, and the abundance of stores featuring real and fake designer watches, purses, shoes, clothing, and electronics only support this testimony. During the Chinese New Year, just entering into the New Year of the Dog, Cantonese people asked for good luck, good health, and great wealth.


More so than capitalism, what brings the East and the West closer is their similar problems. Illness, resource allocation, and disparity have all have taken a toll on the world's governments and peoples. The fortune in Macau is not equally distributed. There are still plenty of people jingling their change cups for a donation, women with babies on their backs sifting through trash to find bits to eat, and plenty of poor that are being left behind in an arena in which they cannot compete; the same exists in Hong Kong, greater China, and for that matter, the rest of the world. Some people are displeased with the move from a traditional society, where the community role was most important, to one more individualistic, working towards an acquisition of wealth and fostering materialism. But in truth, despite differences in expression, money has always been important to the East, just as it has to the West.

More often, people in China complain about the effects of the transition towards the pro-market economy. More instances of growing pains are being heard in Hong Kong from Mainland residents, complaints because of poor compensation for land, corruption, or just plain feeling left behind. The grumbles from the Mainland echo the increasing number of objections voiced by disparaged people in other parts of the world. Walking out of a casino in Macau or Las Vegas, out of a club in Hong Kong or London, people brush past the many homeless and desperate. As each culture deals with its disappointed members (or does not), I wonder if the divide between the East and West will further blur or bold.



Summer in Jerusalem

KA-HON MOK
LINGNAN UNIVERSITY



By the 1920s, in Theodor Herzl's tale *Old New Land*, Jerusalem would someday be transformed into a modern, metropolitan city, "intersected by electric street railways; wide, tree-bordered streets; homes, gardens, boulevard, park; schools, hospitals, buildings, pleasure resorts."¹ Arab and Jew would leave behind the hatred and discrimination left over from European occupation. They would live happily together, establishing a Palace of Peace.

The real Jerusalem, while many people still consider it the most important city in the world, is messy, dangerous, and intense. Palestinians and Israelis do not exist happily as Herzl dreamed. They are similar to an unhappy couple, needing political leaders from both sides to settle the complex and painful divorce in order to live peacefully in the future. Jerusalem, like a child, cannot be divided. It requires joint custody from both sides to define its boundaries and to divide water resources.² Only after the final divorce will Israelis and Palestinians be able to treat each other with respect and resume contact.

Studying at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem during the last summer holiday, I tried to live like a Jerusalemite. Life was not as

dangerous as during the *infitada*, as Avishai Maglalit, professor of philosophy of the university and a critic of Israel's occupation in West Bank, describes:

The streets of the old walled city are silent; shops are boarded up; dignified old tourist guides, bereft of clients, softly beg for a little cash. Only ultra-orthodox Jews still venture into the medieval streets. In the modern western areas of the city. Hotels are empty, abandoned by the tourist trade. You never know where the next bomb attack will strike: on a bus, in a cinema, or in a discotheque.³

Still, security checks were daily realities. At Central Bus Station, bags were double-checked by security officers and scanners; passengers were questioned by security officers about where they were going and whom they would meet; security officers accompanied buses going to settlements. At Museums, one had to pass through metal detectors before buying tickets. At the Jerusalem theatre, there were not only security checks before the show, but also during intermission when the audience was about to return to enjoy the concert. In restaurants, pubs and supermarkets, Jews of Ethiopian or Soviet origins armed with guns stood in front of the entrances, telling guests to open their bags. There was even a security fee at restaurants.

The University was not exempted from tight security measures. From the dorm at which I stayed to the buildings of the international school, there were seven security checks. Also, each time I entered the library, a cafeteria, or a computer laboratory, I had to open my bags for security checks. During field trips, a gun-bearing security guard escorted students.

Compared with the fall of 2002, when the *infitada* reached its peak, the main difference was that Jewish immigrants from the former Soviet Union had replaced Arabs, who have been perceived as potential bombers since the *infitada*, to do jobs like cleaning doors, building houses and mending roads.⁴ With the economic downturn and massive lay-offs due to privatization of banks and telecom companies, many unemployed Jews switched to working as taxi drivers.

Such a trend was alarming for East Jerusalemites who found taxi driving was the only way to bring bread-and-butter home after the infitada. Certainly, it added to the unhappy co-existence of Arabs and Jews.

Perhaps because I was not an Arab or a Jew, taxi drivers openly talked about their anger over the economic downturn, the existence of Arabs inside Israel or the Israeli existence in Jerusalem. One ultra-orthodox Jewish taxi driver who made Aliyah from Russia in 1991, told me on the way back to Mount Scopus, where the Hebrew University is located:

I hate this government because Netanyahu didn't stop jobs being shifted to China and India. He is a slave of big business. The Labor is a traitor, no good. I have five kids. I have to take this job to bring food... The government should not help Arabs; they take up jobs of taxi-drivers. It is a country for Jews, not for Arabs. In fact, they are potential suicide bombers.

A few days later, I chatted with an Arab taxi driver from East Jerusalem. I asked him what he thought of the Israeli presence in East Jerusalem:

Sharon is Hitler. With the dirty money from America, he is building the wall to isolate us, to exclude us, to force back to Ramallah, to cage us forever. He is a murderer, a murderer of Palestinians. I don't understand why Bush is helping him. America is causing troubles everywhere, yesterday, Iran, tomorrow, China.

Before that I had not thought much about why America has, seemingly unconditionally, supported Israel. Now, I argue there are two reasons. First, America has always been the "heaven" for the persecuted, for the religiously oppressed and the politically oppressed. Refugees from other parts of the world have successfully sought refuge in the new land. Jewish people were a part of this trend, especially during WWII and the Holocaust. Second, during the Cold War era, various attempts by Arab states and Iran to destroy Israel, with UN condemnations such as denouncing Zionism as racism and the Soviet support to Arab states, make the bond

between the United States and Israel, which is the main concern and focus for world Jewry, stronger and strengthened the feeling of oppression among Jews.

In regards to the Jewish Diaspora, for them, to visit Israel is to connect their roots, to make intimate bonds between the Jewish State and themselves, and to develop a life-long love affair with the thriving Jewish state. Summer is the high time for young Jews to take the trip. Buses carrying Birthright signs ⁵ were parked outside hotels to pick young Jewish boys and girls up to visit places like Yad Vashem (Holocaust Museum), the Western Wall and the Jewish Quarter of the Old City. After the trip, many of them stay behind, taking classes on Middle Eastern History and exploring the future of the Jewish State. In my class, except a few from Europe, Australia and me, everyone was Jewish from the United States or Canada.

We had contested discussions over the peace process, the status of Jerusalem and whether Zionism is racism. What sparked most fire in our discussions, however, was the disengagement plan from Gaza and various settlements in West Bank. Opponents like one classmate from Australia, who is ultra-orthodox, claimed that Sharon betrayed the settlers and God's will. He also argued that Sharon had rewarded terrorists, Hamas and Islamic Jihad. For another student from London, the opposite seemed to be true. He found such a messianistic attitude would not only endanger Israel, but also seriously distort Zionism, which he argued sees the establishment of a Jewish State as a humane solution to discrimination and contemporary political problems.

Such a discussion took place everywhere in Jerusalem on the eve of the disengagements. Settlers and members of Peacenow distributed orange and blue ribbons at street corners. At the entrances of cinemas and bus stops, in pubs, and in coffee shops, debates were heard. On the buses, anti-disengagement supporters even shouted at passengers who tied blue ribbons to their bags. In newspapers, columnists explored how the disengagement would change the dream of Zionism, Jewish identity, and the political landscape. Nobody had ever expected that Sharon, a hawkish Prime Minister and for Palestinians, an architect of settlement, would carry out the disengagement plan. Considering his previous actions on the issue

and support he had given to the Greater Israel project, it seemed more likely that he would want to occupy the West Bank and Gaza permanently than to reach a permanent peace deal with the Palestinian leader.

One expert at the Shalem Center told me that if Palestinians guarantee the safety of Israel and the Palestinian government disarms Hamas and Islamic Jihad, further disengagements would take place, and that even right-wing leaders will take political risk to achieve the peace deal. On the contrary, an adviser to Ehud Barak and a co-signer of Geneva Initiative expressed his concern that Sharon would use disengagement from Gaza to hold on to West Bank settlements and East Jerusalem.⁶ Many questions are left unanswered.

When I told my classmates that they should visit Ramallah, they screamed with horror:

“Hey, I promised my mom that I wouldn’t go.”

“It is a dangerous town, with guns and bullets everywhere!”

“I have a Jewish nose. They would know me!”

Such reactions were understandable, not only in America, but also in Hong Kong. When I asked my friends and aunts what they thought about the West Bank and Gaza, their responses were

“Such places were as if ghost towns. They always exchange fires with each other!”

To go to Ramallah, I took a bus to the Old City’s Jaffa Gate. Entering the Arab’s old City, the few Israelis I saw--soldiers, ultra-orthodox Jews, and police--were all in groups. The Muslim Quarter was already crowded. Farmers from nearby villagers sold apples, corns and potatoes; restaurant waiters sold hummus; bakery stores sold hot bagles; young men set up stalls to sell a range of products such as electric adapters. Near the Damascus Gate, there were stores for currency exchanges.

One had essentially left Israel once in East Jerusalem. While Israeli banks such as Bank Leumi and Israel Discount Bank had branches, most East Jerusalemites did not have accounts there. On newspaper kiosks, Arabic newspapers replaced Israeli newspapers. From East Jerusalem, I took a minibus to go to Ramallah. A passenger, whose husband worked for the UN in the West Bank, paid

the bus fare for me. She said she wanted to show hospitality to foreign tourists willing to cross through checkpoints to visit West Bank.

The forty-minute journey to the Qulandia checkpoint was pleasant. After crossing the checkpoint, the road was chaotic and dusty. And to go to the town center, I took a yellow minibus.

Ramallah is not a refugee camp. It is the center of Palestinian commerce and entertainment. The atmosphere was secular and dynamic. Cinemas were showing the latest Hollywood films; coffee shops were full of old people drinking espresso or taking hookah waterpipes and shisha; shoe stores were well stocked with Nike; fashion stores sold Chanel. The Ramallah diaspora returned with a large amount of investment capitals. New houses were being built in the villa of the city to sell to Palestinians working for the UN and NGOs. New commercial buildings were also being built to accommodate foreign consulates and corporations.

With the help of my friend, who reported the Palestinian election in January, I met the director of the Health, Development, Information and Policy Institute, an independent think-tank. The director explained his plan for a democratic Palestine:

A democratic Palestine is based on peace, justice and the caring of the underprivileged. It is not ruled by guns and bullets, but by civil societies and open discussion. We need democracy. It was because of the lack of democracy that the Arab leaders could shift peoples' focus on their policy failures by waging wars against Israel. Arafat made a huge mistake. He militarized the Intifada. I am against the separation wall. But I am also against killing innocents. So to fight by civil disobedience, urging international communities to pressurize Israel, to unite with Israeli peace activists would be more effective.

He was right. A democratic Palestine would deliver a devastating blow to Arab states whose leaders have long ruled their countries by guns, bullets and fear. Instead of listening to their people's call for reform, they blame imperialism or Zionists. A free society is a peaceful society. Large-scale wars hardly take place between democratic countries, but usually take place between non-demo-

cratic countries like Iran and Iraq in 1980s. A free society is also economically prosperous. Israel, the only democratic country in the Middle East, is ranked 33 in this year's Index of Economic Freedom published by the Heritage Foundation, compared with Jordan in 58, Egypt in 103 and Syria in 139.⁷ In contrast with non-democratic countries, democratically elected leaders do not rule their countries by despotism. Their actions are responsible and predictable. A free society also has civil right groups to fight against injustice and on behalf of minorities. I admire people like Yossi Beilin and groups like B'Tselem and Rabbis for Human Rights for their work to improve lives in Palestine, in East Jerusalem and lives of Israeli Arabs.

I had a wonderful time in Jerusalem. Despite the tight security checks one must deal with, it is still worth visiting and studying, especially for students of Middle East Studies. Many experts at think tanks, government officials, members of the Knesset and Palestinian Parliament, foreign journalists and members of NGOs would be willing to meet students to answer their questions. It was my pleasure that so many civil society leaders would meet with me, and that those who could not provided me with contact information for future opportunities. With the help of the owner of the bookstore of American Colony Hotel in East Jerusalem, I was introduced to a few European journalists who then spent a whole afternoon with me talking about reporting in West Bank and Jerusalem.

Returning home, friends and exchange students from America all seem interested when I tell them that I visited Jerusalem. I have become an "expert" in Israeli affairs and Middle East Peace among them. Friends kept asking about security there. A student from Mainland China asked me whether democracy is bad for the peace process as different leaders pursue different policies. American students, especially those who are Jewish, were more interested in knowing why I visited Jerusalem and whether I am pro-Israel or pro-Palestine. My response was shocking to them. I told them that, on the state level, I am pro-Israel because of the larger degree of freedom and democracy, including freedom of the press, that it offers. In the end, however, I think that the only solution will be two states for two peoples. I believe that Palestinians deserve a free and

democratically elected government. They deserve the freedom of movement to leave the West Bank and Gaza in order to work and to study. As Arab states see democracy as a threat or are seeking ways to destroy Israel with extremists, we should help Palestinians strengthen their government.

Zionism and Palestinian nationalism should not be based on occupying the land of the other, but should be based on building up states, allowing people to avoid persecution and have safe homes. In the future, a peaceful and prosperous Jerusalem will not only tolerate, but also accept and celebrate religious and political differences.

ENDNOTES

- ¹ Theodor Herzl, *Old New Land*(Altneuland) ,quoted in Ian Buruma and Avishai Margalit, "Occidentalism: The West in the Eyes of Its Enemies," Penguin, London, 2004,p.137
- ² At this time, Israel has been trying to consolidate its control over Jerusalem by annexing Ma'aleh Adumin,(the largest settlement on the West Bank.) Read, Con Coughlin, "A Golden Basin Full of Scorpions," A Little, Brown Book, London, 1997
- ³ Buruma, Ian and Margalit, Avishai, "Occidentalism: The West in the Eyes of Its Enemies," Penguin, London, 2004,p.138
- ⁴ Ibid
- ⁵ Birthright Israel is a program that Jewish youth from 18-26 can take a free 10-day--trip to Israel once in a lifetime (www.birthisrael.com)
- ⁶ Geneva Initiative, signed by various Israeli and Palestinians intellectuals and politicians such as Yossi Beilin, an ex-foreign minister and Abed-Rabbo, Yasser, PLO Executive Committee Member, Former Minister of Culture and Information, is an accord that provides a detailed model for ending the conflict. (<http://www.geneva-accord.org>)
- ⁷ 2005 Index of Economic Freedom, Heritage Foundation, <http://www.heritage.org/research/features/index/>

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
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Rethinking Rural Development

IAN MAY '03



When I heard that the Peace Corps had assigned me to Costa Rica, I have to admit that I did not really know what to make of it. Costa Rica did not really jump to mind when I thought of the Peace Corps. Costa Rica was the only stable democracy in Central America, the only Central American nation without an army, and most of all, a tourist paradise. Why would such a country need the Peace Corps? I thought that I would work reforming gang members of *Mara Salvatrucha* in El Salvador or help a forgotten indigenous community in Guatemala or Bolivia organize to make sustainable micro-business cooperatives. Once I arrived in San José, the blatant lack of street crime and relative safety of the capital city only went to further my misgivings; Costa Rica needed the Peace Corps like a fourteen year-old needs a cell phone, I thought. It might look nice, but is our presence really doing anything?

The program I worked in, however, Rural Community Development, showed another side of the Costa Rican development coin. I worked in the Costa Rica left behind by the economic and tourism booms of the 1990's. My Costa Rica existed outside of the periphery, outside of the cities of San José, Alajuela, Heredia, and

Cartago. Away from the beaches and cloud forests, there lay vast agricultural expanses that gave new meaning to the term "*laissez-faire* economics."

Costa Rica provides a textbook example of periphery-based development. The largest city, the capital of San José, operates in a state of near-mercantilist trade with the rest of the country. The major roads all shoot out from San José like spokes on a wheel but do not connect with one another. Thus to go to different parts of the country you always find yourself traveling through San José. All goods and products also move through San José, to be sold on their way to the ports of Limón and Puntarenas. In Costa Rica's case, this type of development has led the Central Valley (where San José lies) to develop very rapidly, achieving in many areas first world quality roads, security, water, and health systems. But, the outlying areas of the country, where the other 60 percent of the country's population lives, save areas heavily visited by tourists, have had to fight for themselves.

As a Volunteer I worked in Cuatro Esquinas de Los Chiles, a small agricultural community on Costa Rica's northern border with Nicaragua. The town holds the interesting distinction of being two towns in one. Due to the socio-economic problems that have affected Nicaragua in the aftermath of the Revolution and Contra War, coupled with the gross corruption of its most recent presidential regimes, close to one million Nicaraguans have migrated legally and illegally into Costa Rica. Costa Ricans have viewed this migration much the way Americans have viewed the arrival of millions of Latino immigrants to the United States. Nicaraguans in the eyes of Costa Ricans are dirty, intrinsically violent, dark-skinned, ignorant, drunkards, and are great for producing hordes of children. I should note that my host-mother descends from Nicaraguan parents and grandparents, though she was born in Costa Rica, and is a large supporter of these stereotypes about Nicaraguans. She believes that she, like all other Costa Ricans, owes them nothing and should barely pay them enough to live. Conversely, Nicaraguans feel Costa Ricans are a group of unscrupulous crybabies, incapable of doing any physical work, and thus needing Nicaraguans to make sure their economy runs smoothly.

Cuatro Esquinas stands at the junction of these two worlds. On one side there lies Barrio Managua, named after the Nicaraguan capital, where nearly all the families live in wooden shacks with dirt floors. The other half of town has no name other than Cuatro Esquinas, and the houses are mostly made of cement or occasionally wood, and all have cement floors. *Apartheid*-ridden South Africa could not have divided a town between white and non-white more perfectly. The Costa Ricans are the primary landowners in the town and most of the Nicaraguans work as their “*peones*,” planting and harvesting the crops.

As a Rural Development Volunteer my primary missions involved assessing the community using participatory community assessment and then attacking the problems discovered by promoting a community-based response. Quickly I realized that building this type of community consensus necessary for “real” sustainable development would take far longer than the two years allotted to me in my service contract. Moreover, a rural community on the Costa Rican border where more than 60 percent of the population lived in a near-refugee camp atmosphere, surrounded by less than friendly neighbors, did not present a climate conducive to cooperation and change. Everything moves slowly in rural Costa Rica due to bureaucratic hurdles, petty corruption, laziness, and pure inefficiency, throwing the added national dynamic into the mix and only further slowing down the process. Change, just as in any other area of the world, was viewed as suspect. Yet at the same time, people were sick and tired of the poverty that surrounded them. They no longer wanted to feed families of five, six, and seven on \$150 a month, working like dogs for 45 to 60 hours a week on someone else’s land.

My entrance onto the small development stage seemed to fulfill their every idea of how to achieve that instant wealth that America, according to television, exudes through its pores. Needless to say, meeting attendance dropped off precipitously as soon as I told them that I had no money to write them checks; would not do that anyway; and that I envisioned them working together hand in hand, *Nica* and *Tico*, to build a better community. Most people, I now believe, wanted me to write them a check to help build them a new

house. I can imagine that all this talk of working together, without monetary gifts, sounded suspiciously Communistic to them. Yet, here it was coming from a *yanqui*.

The people wanted, just like all humans do, a gift. As fellow Peace Corps volunteer Andria Hayes-Birchler explained in her essay, *The Cadeaux Trap*, featured in the 2005 edition of the Washington College International Studies Review, this type of development, while quickly fixing the problem statistically in the minds of the government, paralyzes the rural areas, making them dependent on handouts. In Costa Rica, the government, buoyed by U.S. government loans and the prestige of being the only stable, war-free Central American nation, began to *regular*, or “gift” housing, land, and other essentials. This pattern continued through the 1980’s and 1990’s when Costa Rica was one of the world’s largest recipients of foreign aid, both from the U.S. government and non-governmental sources. Yet in the late 1990’s the money began to dry up and by September 11 the U.S. had already begun to shift its focus away from Latin America. The U.S. now had little strategic reason to invest, as after September 11 only migration (not much of which, percentage-wise, comes from Costa Rica) served as a major interest. The Costa Rican government, facing increasing inflation of up to 20 percent, was running out of money.

Politically, development began to be scaled back. The rural areas, yet again, were ignored by development plans that only had a four year life span. With each successive government attempting to convert their political victories into something for the people, tangible development projects, usually related to infrastructure, began to inorganically spring up in rural communities. The government began to subscribe to the development paradigm of the “quick fix.”

Government agency heads or representatives would visit isolated communities, such as Cuatro Esquinas, in their late-model SUVs and would give a quick pep talk to the townspeople, whom the town’s elders had harangued into coming, telling them that government people meant money. The government workers would then quickly leave, after shaking many hands and using levels of Spanish unknown to much of the population. Their emphasis on working


together, sacrifice, and self-determination seemed a little ironic considering that the world they come from compared little with the realities of the communities in which they spoke.

I came into this development model supposedly as the catalyst to these development strategies, but found a community response quite the opposite of what the same government workers had told me to expect. The process of *regalaring* development had not produced any development: rather it had produced dependence. The lack of funds and abandonment of the rural communities imposed by the post-1990's crunch had only furthered the dependence of communities like Cuatro Esquinas. While the government has forcibly had to shift its tune to sustainable development projects, it has made the jump without any transition between one extreme and the other. Cuatro Esquinas was now also tasked with achieving development between two different nationalities.

When these tasks are given to a rural community, especially one like Cuatro Esquinas where the literacy rate hovers between 25 percent and 40 percent and mutual distrust runs high, the development picture has no quick fix. Development can start to work after two-to-four year cycles, but it needs constant help. Help does not mean handouts or gifts, but training and market assistance. In the case of Cuatro Esquinas, it could mean simply being able to purchase goods at the same price as they are available in the capital rather than at the inflated prices charged along the border. Development cannot have merely a four year life span. It needs constant nourishment and encouragement. It needs the government workers not to arrive in powerful SUVs, but in a beat-up pick-up borrowed from the next town over, because they too form part of the community. Government workers need to show communities that development is a slow process, that you have to crawl before you can walk, and walk before you can run. Otherwise the rural poor will simply see rural development as another gift from above.

Teranga (meaning hospitality)

MINETY ABRAHAM '04



In June 2005, I had the privilege of attending a two week-long International Conference on Public Management, Policy and Development, in Dakar, Senegal. The primary theme of the Conference was “Global Challenges and Opportunities: Best Practices in Public Policy and Development for the 21st Century.” Conference participants included civil servants, elected officials, university faculty, students, health professionals, non-governmental organizations, and members of the private sector representing countries in Africa, Asia, and the United States. Overall, the aim of the Conference was to identify and promote effective public policy and developmental practices in Sub-Saharan Africa.

In order to comprehend the significance of this conference, one must first understand the history of Senegal. Like many other African nations, Senegal has struggled to overcome the legacy of colonialism and to effectively manage the transition into a democratic society. Senegal gained its independence from France in 1960. After independence, Senegal was ruled by the Socialist Party for forty years until the current President Abdoulaye Wade was elected in 2000. In spite of some minor political setbacks, Senegal remains one of the most stable democracies in Africa.

Since 1994, the government of Senegal has implemented structural reform programs and the economy has been on a solid growth trajectory, expect for minor economic downturns. According to the World Bank, the economic prospects for the 2006–2008 periods are positive: GDP growth rate is expected to average 5.1 percent, with an inflation rate of under 2 percent and a current account balance within historical range, averaging 6.5 percent of GDP. In spite of these accomplishments, Senegal is plagued by chronic unemployment rate of 48 percent, population pressures, and other developmental issues.¹

Given these circumstances, prior to my arrival in Dakar, I sat anxiously at the edge of my seat trying to imagine what life was like in Senegal. I had heard Senegal referred to as the land of *Teranga* (meaning hospitality), but I wanted to experience the sights, sounds, and smells on my own. As soon as I stepped off the plane, I was greeted by a Senegalese gentleman in the local dialect, Wolof (The Wolof people are one of the largest people groups that inhabit modern-day Senegal):

Naga def? How are you doing?

I quietly responded:

Bonsoir, Monsieur Good evening, Sir.

As I walked away, he let out a beautiful smile as if we were acquaintances from years past. For a moment, I could not help but admire the contrast of his beautiful white teeth against the rich darkness of his skin.

Overcome with jetlag, at 5:00am the next morning, I was awoken by familiar, yet foreign sound that reminded me of my childhood. It was the Muslim morning “call to prayer,” *Allah-u-Akbar*, which can be translated as “God is Most Great.” The call to prayer, the religious recitation that’s heard from mosques around the world, echoed throughout the city five times a day. At breakfast, my fellow travelers described the call to prayer as foreign and mysterious, and at times some found it irritating. Throughout the morning conver-

sation, my attention kept drifting in and out as I tried to imagine life outside of the confines of the gated hotel complex.

Like the excitement of a child waiting to open presents on Christmas, I could hardly wait to venture out and explore Dakar. What better way to see the city than shopping with two other women in 100°F plus and 75 percent humidity weather? Unfortunately, I failed to realize that most Senegalese conduct business in either early morning or late afternoon, in order to avoid the unbearable midday heat. In June, the discomfort from the heat and humidity is miserable. My clothes started to stick to my skin, due to the searing heat of a Senegalese summer. The main marketplace *Sandaga* was a delightful place to shop. Adding to the discomfort of the heat, the market smelt of rotten fish and vegetables. Meat hung from large hooks, while giant green flies feasted off the meat. Live chickens fluttered about in their cages, and the fish flapped around in open zinc buckets. *Ah, the sights and sounds of Africa!*

The central market was surrounded by many small shops and persistent vendors who clustered in the area. One lady wearing gorgeous intricately woven sun-kissed orange and pale blue African regalia called me over to her stall and asked me to purchase her goods. Unlike shopping in the United States, when shopping in Senegal, bargaining is customary. Shoppers and vendors become so engaged in the exchange that a foreigner might mistake this exchange for an argument. Furthermore, food and clothing were spread out on mats on the floor and all over the sidewalk. It was also fascinating to watch women carrying their babies on their backs, while balancing heavy loads on their heads. The marketplace was lively and filled with the laughter of clients and vendors. What struck me the most was that everyone seemed relaxed and cheerful. My shopping experience was stress-free and then it hit me that the spirit of *Teranga* had manifested itself again. Shopping in Dakar was a communal experience; a time to share laughter and interact with strangers; it was something to be enjoyed, not stressed over.

Over the next couple of days, I sat through hours of fascinating presentations and discussions. Conference workshops and panel sessions were organized into several areas of interest including: Health, Poverty, and Public Policy; Natural Resources and Food

Security; Infrastructure and Public/Private Management; Technology and Development; Decentralization and Governance; Education, Gender, and Development; and Citizenship, Democracy, and Human Rights. At one point, I felt like the discussions were uneven. Our Senegalese counterparts listened diligently to papers presented by participants from the United States. In contrast, it was as if the foreign participants failed to comprehend and appreciate the ideas proposed by their Senegalese counterparts. I even heard phrases like, "*that's not how we do it in America*" and "*This country is backwards.*" Were we telling the Senegalese how to live their lives and change their government, rather than exchanging information on best practices? We failed to acknowledge the successes and struggles of the democratic movement in Senegal and we only focused on the negatives and unaccomplished work. Is this how the dialogue would end? Did we believe that we had the correct answers? Did we fail to capitalize on this wonderful opportunity to exchange information between future African and American leaders? As these questions raced through I mind, I realized that we often fail to learn from other cultures and experiences because we are unable to overcome the prejudices of our own culture and experiences.

Perhaps one of the most promising aspects of this conference was the relationships formed among the young African delegates and university students from the United States. It was clear that the Senegalese students shared a common vision of how to bring about change and improve the circumstances that characterize modern day Senegal. The youth of Senegal are in need of access to technology. Through global interaction, they are seeking to improve the accountability and effectiveness of their governments. At the end of the conference, it became apparent that young Senegalese leaders and activists must decide the priorities for their communities, and that their choices will determine their future and the future of Senegal. While experts predict that the demographic pressures and the population explosion in Africa will have negative consequences, the youth of Africa combined with the African Diaspora in the West are hopeful that young leaders of Africa will bring about the positive changes that have eluded the continent of Africa for decades.

ENDNOTES

- ¹ "Country Brief: Senegal," *The World Bank*, September 2005, <<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/AFRICAEXT/SENEGALEXTN/0,,menuPK:296312~pagePK:141132~piPK:141107~theSitePK:296303,00.html> (9 March 2006)

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Contributors

ARTICLE AUTHORS

Edoardo Bressanelli is currently a visiting student at Royal Holloway College, University of London. After graduating from the United World College of the Adriatic (Trieste, Italy), he studied Politics and International Relations at the Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies and at the Faculty of Political Science of the University of Pisa. He has researched in Mexico and in Finland (University of Helsinki). His main interests lie in the fields of political parties, with a particular emphasis on the European dimension, and International Relations Theory.

Ellie Hearne is currently studying for an M.A. (Hons) in International Relations at the University of St. Andrews in Scotland. As well as political violence and international security, Ellie is interested in the study of foreign policy. Her academic exchange with Washington College began in August 2005 and since then Ellie has become involved in various areas of campus life. She hopes to secure an internship in Washington, D.C. for the summer, before returning to Scotland in September for the final year of her Honours degree. Born in Ireland, Ellie was raised in the UK, but hopes to return to the States in 2007 for graduate school or employment.

David Hosey '07 is an International Studies major with a concentration in the Middle East and North Africa and a minor in Philosophy. During his time at Washington College he has studied abroad at Al Akhawayn University in Ifrane, Morocco and attended a summer seminar in Cuba. He is particularly interested in peace and social justice issues both internationally and domestically, and will be

travelling to Bosnia this summer with the United Methodist Church to work at a youth centre.

Andrew Mehdizadeh '08 is a Political Science major and an Economics minor. He has traveled to many places, including Iran, and has a strong interest in other cultures, politics, and international relations. He will participate in the Washington Center Internship program in Fall 2006, and hopes to attend law school after graduation. He is Secretary of the International Relations Club, and participates in numerous other extracurricular activities, including Habitat for Humanity.

Christina Naguiat '07 is an Economics and International Studies double major with a concentration in Asian affairs. She has studied a year of Bachillerato in Spain, and during her time at Washington College she has studied abroad at Lingnan University in Hong Kong and at the Pontificia Universidad Catolica Argentina in Buenos Aires. She also interned with a Member of the British Parliament while attending the London School of Economics and Politics through the Hansard Society Scholars Programme in the Fall of 2006. Particularly interested in conflict resolution and international development, she hopes to enter the foreign service or work for USAID.

Kathleen O'Neill '06 is an Economics and International Studies major with a concentration in North Africa and the Middle East. While at Washington College she studied at Al Akhawayn University in Ifrane, Morocco for one semester. She also participated in the pilot program of the summer seminar in Tanzania. She is currently applying to graduate school and she would like to work in the field of economic developmental policy.

Lindsey Nicole Wilkins '06 is an International Studies major with a concentration in European studies. During her time at Washington College she has studied abroad in Australia at Bond Uni-

versity, and attended the Geneva Model United Nations in March of 2006. She is particularly interested in human rights defenders and the global human rights violations that need to be addressed in third world countries. She is writing her senior thesis on democracy in Russia and using the Chechen wars as a case study. She hopes to someday work abroad as a human rights activist or missionary.

NOTES FROM ABROAD AUTHORS

Minety Abraham graduated from Washington College in May 2004 with a B.A. in Political Science. Upon graduation, she participated in the American Studies Institute at Washington College. In the summer of 2005, she undertook an internship with the Government Accountability Office (GAO). The following fall, she interned at the U.S. Department of State working on the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief. She is currently a Master's candidate at the University of Pittsburgh's Graduate School of Public and International Affairs. After graduation, she intends to work for the federal government.

Nicole Idanna Alpert graduated from Washington College in 2005. She studied abroad in Hong Kong her sophomore year, which served as her inspiration to return post-graduation. She is now working at Lingnan University in Hong Kong and is enjoying it immensely.

Ka-Hon (Jonathan) Mok, of Lingnan University, Hong Kong, is a history major with a special interest in the Middle East. He spent time in Israel in January last year to observe and report the Palestinian presidential election. He also studied at the Summer Institute for Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem in July of last year. In the future, he is planning to enroll in graduate school, preferably the Hebrew University, for an MA degree in the politics of the Middle East.

Ian May graduated from Washington College in 2003 with majors in International Studies—concentrating in Latin American Affairs and Sub-Saharan African Affairs—and Hispanic Studies. After graduation he interned with the U.S. Agency for International Development in Washington, D.C. and with the U.S. State Department at the U.S. Consulate General in Calgary, Alberta. Since January 2004 Ian has worked as a Rural Community Development Volunteer with the Peace Corps in Cuatro Esquinas de Los Chiles, Costa Rica. After finishing his time in the Peace Corps, Ian will attend Johns Hopkins University's post-baccalaureate pre-medical program and hopes to move into the field of international medicine.

Yukiko Omagari graduated from Washington College in 2005 with a major in International Studies and a certificate in Near Eastern Studies. After receiving the State of Kuwait Government Scholarship in 2005 as a Japanese citizen, she is currently pursuing a certificate in advanced Arabic Language at Kuwait University. She traveled to Lebanon in the winter to work with the Insan Association and to participate in programs organized by the Foundation for Human Rights and Humanitarian Rights, Lebanon. Both organizations, located in Beirut, have been striving for human rights and non-violence, and are contributing to the democratization of the country. She wishes to thank the Society of Junior Fellows of Washington College, whose support originally enabled her to connect with these organizations last year.



COLOPHON

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